The initial phase of his adversity commenced with his arrest and exile. At the age of three, the Ottomans incarcerated him and his family in Mosul prison due to the uprising led by Sheikh Abdulsalam Barzani. Subsequently, they were deported to Sulaimani. As Barzani matured, he became involved in armed resistance, gaining prominence in battles that gradually made his name resonate among Kurds far and wide.
First, the assassination attempt on Mullah Mustafa Barzani in 1936
After the suppression of the First Barzan Revolution and the extradition of Sheikh Ahmad Barzani and Mala Mustafa Barzani by the Turks to the Iraqi monarchy, they were arrested along with their families in Mosul. During this time, Khoshawi Audish launched the Khoshawi Revolution. The royal government, particularly Hasamuddin Juma, who served as both the police director and administrator of the former governor, Omar Nazmi, believed that Mullah Mustafa was supporting Khoshawi's movement and serving as its inspiration. In 1936, an attempt was made on Barzani's life when poison was slipped into his coffee. Following this incident, Mullah Mustafa remained unconscious for two weeks but miraculously survived.
In the effort to rescue Mullah Mustafa, those involved included Sheikh Ajil Yawar, the families of Kashmula and Abawin. Rumors also circulated about the involvement of a French doctor residing in Syria at the time who played a role in treating Mullah Mustafa.
Second, the assassination attempt on Mullah Mustafa Barzani in 1961
After the outbreak of the September Revolution on September 11, 1961, and the subsequent victories of the Peshmerga in several battles, the Iraqi government attempted to initiate negotiations with the Kurdish political leadership, particularly General Mustafa Barzani. However, simultaneously, they made covert attempts to assassinate Mullah Mustafa, publishing multiple false claims of his death.
Abdulkarim Qasim, intent on solidifying his dictatorial rule in Iraq and persuading Mullah Mustafa Barzani to relinquish the legitimate rights of the Kurdish people and relocate to Barzan, sent a letter to Sheikh Ahmad Barzani requesting his assistance in arranging a meeting with President Mustafa Barzani. Sheikh Ahmad, not declining the request, dispatched two of his emissaries to Mullah Mustafa to negotiate a meeting with Abdul Karim Qasim's representative, Brigadier Hassan Aboudi of the fifth brigade. Massoud Barzani recounts this episode in the initial section of the third volume of his book "Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement."
On December 17, the government selected a site near Sarsang for the meeting, but Barzani chose to remain near the village of Bamarne. Instead, he dispatched several emissaries to the designated location to await Hassan Aboud's arrival, intending to escort him to Barzani's preferred meeting place. Barzani's suspicions were validated when it became clear that Qasim aimed to ambush both him and Hassan Aboud at the designated site. Just after Hassan Aboud departed for Barzani's location with his envoys, four aircrafts arrived and bombarded the area extensively and with precision. Hassan Aboud watched from a distance, deeply troubled by the intense bombing.
As this narrative shows, the experience and foresight of the late Barzani thwarted the conspiracy of the enemies and prevented their wishes from coming true and their terrorist attempt failed. “I am not asking Qasim to give me anything,” Barzani told Hassan Aboudi there. Let him give the Kurdish people their rights and I will leave Iraq.”
Third, the assassination attempt on Mullah Mustafa Barzani in 1971
"Although the September Revolution had achieved some of its goals and autonomy was officially recognized for Kurdistan for the first time, the enemies of Kurdistan and President Mustafa Barzani did not relent. They continued to plan and conspire to assassinate him."
"On September 15, 1971, two religious scholars, Abdul Jabbar Azami, a Sunni cleric, and Abdul Hussein Dakhili, a Shiite cleric, visited Mustafa Barzani, who warmly welcomed them. The scholars explained that they had come due to the tense situation between the revolution and the Iraqi regime, which was affecting public opinion. They warned that they planned to initiate a campaign among religious scholars and the general populace. Seeking to mitigate conflicts and strengthen the existing peace, they requested President Mustafa Barzani's perspective on the matter."
"Barzani expressed his opinion, appreciated their efforts, and offered his support. Everything seemed normal until it was revealed that the driver who brought the two religious scholars was an agent of the Iraqi intelligence agency. His mission was to observe the security measures in place for Mullah Mustafa Barzani, familiarize himself with the geography of the region and Barzani's headquarters, and identify where Barzani sat and welcomed his guests."
"On September 29, 1971, a delegation consisting of Abdul Hussein Dakhili, Sheikh Abdul Jabbar Azami, Sheikh Abdul Wahab Azami, Sheikh Ibrahim Ghanim Khuza'i, Sheikh Ahmad Hiti, Sheikh Baqir Muzaffar, Sheikh Ghazi al-Dlemi, Sheikh Nur Yasin, and Sheikh Abdul Jalil al-Musawy arrived in Haji-Omeran. They had come to address the issues between the revolution and the Iraqi government. The delegation traveled in two vehicles, a Toyota pickup and a 1963 Chevrolet, driven by Sulaiman Kukhi and Mohammed Kamil Ismail, both members of the Baghdad intelligence agency."
"Vehicles were not allowed to pass at the Haji Omeran checkpoint, but a member of the delegation, Abdul Jabbar Azami, threatened to report the guards to President Mustafa Barzani if they were not permitted to proceed. Consequently, they were allowed to pass."
"When the delegation arrived, President Mustafa Barzani, Dr. Mahmoud Barzani, and Massoud Barzani were all together. Barzani was notified of their arrival and their names were announced. Barzani made the decision to meet with them after the evening prayer."
The guests presented Mullah Mustafa with a Qur'an and another Shariah book, which he graciously accepted and thanked them for. Shortly after, the tea maker from headquarters entered the room and began serving tea to Sheikh Hadi Khazraji, seated opposite President Mustafa Barzani. Sheikh Hadi, who had covertly brought a tape recorder to capture Mullah Mustafa's voice, seized the moment when the teacup's sound and the tea maker briefly blocked his view, pressing the recorder's button. However, instead of recording, the device exploded, filling the room with smoke."
Massoud Barzani, who was with President Mustafa Barzani before the explosion, rushed to the site upon hearing the blast. He recalled, "Initially, I feared my father's residence had been targeted, but later learned he had departed for his guests earlier than scheduled, where the terrorist attack occurred. I thought my father had been assassinated, but one of his bodyguards reassured me that President Mustafa Barzani had only sustained minor injuries from a pellet and was safe."
Massoud Barzani recounted the aftermath of the terrorist attack as follows: Four individuals entering the reception room were struck down by bomb projectiles. Those seated to my father's right and left sustained injuries, and those who could fled for safety. Barzani himself exited the room and instructed the Peshmergas not to harm anyone, except the two drivers who were attempting to reach the Chevrolet, which had also been targeted with explosives. The taillights of both cars were equipped with rockets to track them if they attempted escape in any vehicle. These drivers hurled hand grenades as they fled. By five twenty-five, the threat was neutralized with the elimination of the conspirators.
In this terrorist act, nine mullahs and two drivers lost their lives, along with two martyred Peshmergas and fourteen others wounded. After the crowd dispersed, the Toyota rigged with explosives detonated, but fortunately caused no further damage.
After expressing their relief and good wishes to Barzani upon his survival from the terrorist attack, the Iraqi Ba'ath Party leadership sent a telegram. President sent Abdul Sattar Jawari, a minister acting on behalf of the President, then personally visited President Barzani, both denying any knowledge of the terrorist act.
A joint committee was established to uncover the truth and identify those responsible for the terrorist act, but it proved futile. Information obtained by the Revolutionary Defense Agency suggested that the regime itself had orchestrated the plan.
Nazim Gazar, then head of Iraq's intelligence agency, likely played a pivotal role in executing the plan, but the ultimate decision-maker was higher up the chain. Massoud Barzani recounts in the third volume of the second part of his book, "Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement": "Mam Jalal informed me that during his dialogues in Baghdad in 1983, Saddam confessed to being aware of the plot to assassinate Mullah Mustafa and expressed great dissatisfaction over its failure," Barzani revealed . . .
Fourth, the 1972 assassination attempt
After the failed terrorist attempt by the Iraqi intelligence agency at Barzani's headquarters, the agency did not heed the lesson and persisted with its terrorist activities. On July 15, 1972, Ibrahim Gabari arrived in Iraq from Syria, purportedly fleeing persecution by the Syrian government. Gabari frequented the fifth branch of the Party (KDP) extensively and established contact with the Iraqi intelligence agency, which then assigned him a task.
Nazim Gazar, then head of Iraqi intelligence, instructed Ibrahim Gabari to infiltrate Barzani's headquarters and attempt to assassinate him. Failing that, he was to target either Idris Barzani or Massoud Barzani, the son of the leader of the Kurdistan Liberation Movement. Gabari agreed and traveled to the liberated areas under the revolution's control, seeking a meeting with Massoud Barzani under the guise of sharing an important secret.
Massoud Barzani met with Gabari, who informed him about the Iraqi intelligence agency's request. Barzani urged Gabari not to relent but to persist in his activities, curious about what more the agency might demand of him.
The Iraqi intelligence agencies instructed Ibrahim Gabari to take photographs with President Mustafa Barzani, Idris Barzani, and Massoud Barzani to convince them of his proximity to Barzani's headquarters. Massoud Barzani complied with Gabari's request and took the photographs. Gabari then presented these photographs to Nazim Gazar, who believed him and subsequently sent a bag full of TNT to the liberated areas under revolutionary control. The plan was to use the TNT to assassinate Mala Mustafa Barzani or, failing that, to target one of his two sons.
The TNT bag was handed over to the Revolutionary Intelligence, and the news of Barzani's failed assassination attempt was published in the Khabat newspaper. However, the Ba'ath regime, consistent with their previous denials of terrorist acts, disavowed any involvement in this attempt. The Interior Ministry also denied the involvement of any Iraqi government institution in this terrorist plot.
Saddam Hussein established a fact-finding committee composed of Abdul Khaliq Samarai, representative of the Ba'ath Party; Mukaram Talabani, representative of the Communist Party; Mohammed Mahmoud Abdul Rahman, representative of the Party; Aziz Sharif; Dara Tawfiq; and Ihsan Sherzad. The committee visited Nawprdan, examined the evidence, and interviewed Ibrahim Gabari, who confessed to everything and named the officers involved in the conspiracy, including Officer Basil Araji. When Abdul Khaliq Samarai inquired about the officer's appearance, Gabari's description matched perfectly, confirming his knowledge. Samarai promised to present the committee's findings to his superiors, but the Ba'ath Party took no action until Nazim Gazar's coup on June 20, 1973, aimed at overthrowing President Ahmad Hassan Bakr and seizing power in Iraq. Subsequently, the Ba'ath regime admitted that the terrorist attacks of September 29, 1971, and July 15, 1972, were orchestrated by Nazim Gazar, incited by foreign influences.
In addition to these attempts, there were several other terrorist acts aimed at disrupting security under revolutionary rule. However, due to the vigilance of revolutionary security agencies, these efforts were largely unsuccessful. Importantly, the revolutionary leadership never retaliated against terrorist acts with similar violence. If the Kurdistan Liberation Movement sought revenge, they would target only those responsible for the terrorist acts, not women, children, or innocent people. This principle was a core belief of President Mustafa Barzani, who always encouraged his followers and the leaders of the Kurdistan Peshmerga Forces to avoid operations that could harm innocent civilians.
Sources:
1.مسعود بارزانی، بارزانی و بزووتنەوەی ڕزگاریخوازی کورد، بەرگی یەکەم، شۆڕشی ئەیلوول ١٩٣١- ١٩٥٨، چاپی یەکەم (هەولێر- چاپخانەی وەزارەتی پێشمەرگە- ٢٠٠٤).
2.مسعود بارزانی، بارزانی و بزووتنەوەی ڕزگاریخوازی کورد، بەرگی سێیەم، بەشی دووەم، شۆڕشی ئەیلوول ١٩٦١- ١٩٧٥، چاپی یەکەم (هەولێر- چاپخانەی وەزارەتی پێشمەرگە- ٢٠٠٤).
3.kdp Encyclopedia Archive.
