The situation before the activity

After the successes of the Peshmerga forces in the Zakho Valley battle, Issa Siwar requested Mustafa Barzani to form a special force to strike the Ain Zalah oil company. After obtaining approval and discussing all aspects of the operation, preparations began in complete secrecy. Asaad Khoshawi, the General Commander of the Badinan region, appointed Issa Siwar to lead the military operation. The leaders of the region focused on gathering information about the Ain Zalah location, which was approximately 15 to 20 km away from the mountainous area. The walking distance was 8 to 10 hours from the nearest Peshmerga position. The Tigris River was a water barrier for the Peshmerga to cross. The operation had to be carried out in a record time so that they would not face government forces during the retreat and could stay away from the bombardment of warplanes. What made the operation easier for the Peshmerga was that in September 1962, two Kurdish policemen named Hama Sur Hussein Barzanji and Mustafa Faraj Shawani, who worked at the Ain Zalah oil company, joined the revolution. After discussions with the regional commanders, consultation, and exchange of information, they expressed their readiness to participate in the operation. Thus, final approval for the operation was given.

Peshmerga preparations

Before the Peshmerga crossed the Tigris River, Issa Siwar held a meeting with all the squad leaders and Peshmerga officials. In that meeting, he divided the force into three groups and assigned each group a commander along with their task as follows:

First group: The force of Issa Siwar, consisting of Mullah Hamdi Abdulmajid Salafi, Abdulrahim Jasim, Sergeant Darwish, and Haji Qado Gravi, along with the main guide Mustafa Faraj. The task of this group was to control the main gate of the company.

Second group: The force of Hashim Merozi, consisting of Ali Ali Saifadin, Murad Mumi, and Shahin Shekho, along with a number of Peshmerga and the main guide Hama Sur Hussein Barzanji. The main task of this group was to attack the Ain Zalah police station.

The last group under the supervision of Ali Halo Ali was with squad leader Abdulrahman Dino and a number of other Peshmerga. The task of this group was to control several important facilities within the company, especially the (switchboard and radio) room, along with a reserve force that was deployed on the hills surrounding the company.

Enemy losses and Peshmerga gains

On the night of October 11 to 12, 1962, the Peshmerga began carrying out the operation. According to the plan that had been set for it, after a fierce confrontation with the guards and police inside the company, they were able to achieve their goals. As a result, a number of police were killed and wounded. They were also able to take 70 police and officers as prisoners, among whom were the company manager (Dick Dankort) and two British engineers. At the same time, the Peshmerga burned the oil depot, the telephone switchboard, and eight of the company's vehicles. The Peshmerga's gains in that operation were 33 rifles and machine guns, six pistols, two Bren machine guns, and two cameras, along with a large amount of medical equipment and supplies. The losses of the Peshmerga forces in that epic were the martyrdom of a Peshmerga named Shahin Shekho, whose body was later exhumed by Iraqi forces and inhumanely desecrated, and after that, it was dragged through Ain Zalah by a military vehicle. 

The impact of the Peshmerga activity

Due to the importance and impact of the success of the operation, Mullah Mustafa Barzani sent a congratulatory telegram to Issa Siwar. After all the police and employees of the company were released by the Peshmerga force, only on the orders of President Barzani were the foreign prisoners sent to his headquarters. Upon reaching the headquarters, they were welcomed by Barzani himself, treated with great respect, and provided with all the necessities for their comfort. It must be said that at the time of the release of those prisoners and all foreign persons by the Kurdish revolution, no material gains were requested from any party; they were released unconditionally.

 This indicates that the Kurdish revolution, under the guidance of the leader of the revolution Mullah Mustafa Barzani, has always observed the principles of human rights, humanitarian values, and the laws of war, and has never resorted to harming prisoners of war or violence, despite the brutal treatment of the enemy army and the lack of international support for the revolution, which only had the mountains as its friend and relied upon them.     

The Ain Zalah activity in the memoirs of Iraqi Army military commanders

Even this major activity mentioned was clearly referred to in the writings and memoirs of the Iraqi Army military commanders who were enemies of the Kurdish revolution. For example, Brigadier General Saeed Hamo Talafari, then commander of the Second Battalion of the 11th Brigade of the Iraqi Army, testifies and writes: "That brave operation required high physical ability, because the Peshmerga were able to cross the Tigris River twice; the operation was carried out in two nights and one day." Also, Staff Brigadier General Abdulkarim Farhan, commander of the First Division of the Iraqi Army, wrote: "Kurdish revolutionaries carried out a successful and brave campaign against the Ain Zalah oil wells, northwest of Mosul."

 The goal of the activity

The purpose of that operation was to show the Iraqi government that the Peshmerga's reach was not limited to the mountainous areas, but rather that they could go further and do work like the mountain operations in the vast flat plains as well. On the other hand, this attack on the Ain Zalah company had a great impact among international financial circles. As a result of that work, in international corridors, the attention paid to the Kurdish revolution doubled, while the government's reputation fell because it could not protect its own institutions. At the same time, it instilled fear in those foreign countries that had oil interests in Iraq.

 One can also talk about another positive aspect of this operation for the reputation of the Kurdish revolution and the tarnishing and defamation of the government's prestige, which was that it had an effect on encouraging foreign journalists to visit Kurdistan and investigate the Kurdish revolution, the reasons for it, the killing of the Kurdish people, and conveying the voice of the Kurdish revolution to the world.

Sources:

1- Abdul Fattah Ali al-Butani, Badinan Region 1925 – 1970, Vol. 2, Salahaddin University Press, Erbil, 2017, pp. 178 – 179.

1- Rozhin Chalabi Munir, Zakho July 14, 1958 – March 6, 1975, Zakho Center for Kurdish Studies, Zakho, 2018, pp. 162 – 164.

3- Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Three, Part One, Ministry of Education Press, 2004, p. 95.

4- Shawkat Mullah Ismail Hassan, Days in the History of the September Revolution, Second Edition, Tafsir Office, Erbil, 2006, p. 125.

5- Saeed Hammo, Memoirs of an Infantry Brigade Commander, Baghdad, 1977, p. 52.