The government of Iraq in the month of June 1963 intensified all its efforts to end the Kurdish revolution by restarting its attacks and assaults on the revolution's areas in various regions of Kurdistan. After the Iraqi Army and hired gunmen (Jash) on the Akre front were able to seize Sere Akre and the Pers mountain, which, due to heavy shelling, artillery fire, and successive attacks, resulted in the Martyrdom of the Peshmerga force Commander Mela Shni and five Peshmerga, this had a negative impact on the morale of the Peshmerga. The Peshmerga forces abandoned those trenches and retreated towards Ble and Rezan to establish another defensive line so as not to allow the Iraqi Army to set foot in Barzan, as all its intentions were to reach it and lay it to waste and ruin.
On July 31, 1963, the First Division of the Iraqi Army, which consisted of the First and Fourth Brigades, as well as the participation of seven thousand hired gunmen (Jash) from the Zebari, Surchi, Goran, Herki, Sharafani, Yazidi, Kocher, and Barwari tribes, descended from the foothills of the Pers mountain towards Ble and crossed the Great Zab. They seized Ble and its surroundings and fortified both sides of the Zab. At that time, Barzani's headquarters was still in the Dalash valley, which is located east of the Sefti village. The Iraqi Army bombed the headquarters with several warplanes and attacked it, with the intention of besieging it and capturing Mustafa Barzani, the leader of the revolution, and Masoud Barzani, who was accompanying him along with 15 Peshmerga guards. However, they were able to resist them, protect themselves, and escape that assault by the army and the Jash.
At that moment, a telegram from the Iraqi Army fell into the hands of the revolution's leadership, stating that on August 4 the Iraqi Army intended to launch an attack on Barzan. Barzani ordered that a defensive line be established at Mli Sarije between Ble and Barzan so as not to allow the Iraqi Army to set foot in Barzan and destroy it, and for the government to achieve its goal, because Barzani himself was present there and was directly supervising the battle. To establish the defensive line, he tasked the Peshmerga Commander Hussein Mergasori to take responsibility for that axis of the battle, to fortify their trenches at Mli Sarije, and not to allow the advances of the army and their Jash to reach Barzan.
Hussein Mergasori tasked the Peshmerga and distributed them to the trenches, and he himself waited for zero hour in the middle of the defensive line. Before the attack began, for a day and a night, the government shelled the Peshmerga trenches with artillery and aircraft. Then, on the morning of August 4, 1963, with a large and extensive attack and all kinds of heavy and light weapons, they assaulted the Peshmerga trenches. The Peshmerga also confronted them with the light weapons they had at hand, which consisted of a machine gun and a number of British Brno rifles. After 10 hours of fighting and clashes, the Peshmerga forces were able to defeat the attack of the army and the Jash with dozens of dead and wounded, forcing them to retreat, leaving the bodies of 40 of their dead on the battlefield. However, from the Peshmerga forces, the Peshmerga Commander Hussein Mergasori and three Peshmerga were Martyred, and another one was wounded.
Two days later, that is on August 6, the government forces turned towards the east with the intention of capturing Rezan, which was another flank of the defensive line under the command of Uzair Dolamari, Omar Agha Dolamari, and Hali Dolamari, who had a force of approximately 200 Peshmerga with them. After heavy bombing of the surroundings of the Rezan bridge, the army and Jash forces began to move towards the bridge. The Peshmerga were lying in wait in their trenches until the Military and Jash reached the bridge and some of them crossed, then they suddenly attacked them and showered them with a hail of bullets. The soldiers and hired gunmen became confused, their ranks were broken, their attack was defeated, and they fled. This time, they left the bodies of 36 of their dead on the battlefield, of which 14 bodies fell into the Great Zab and were carried away by the water.
It is clear that in that epic of that battle axis, the Peshmerga forces had a mortar of size 3 with them, which had only 12 shells at hand, and they had fired 6 of them at the enemy and had kept 6 more. But by the luck of the Peshmerga, their first shell had fallen into a group of Jash and killed some of them, which created a dangerous situation for the army and the Jash.
After the defeat of the government forces in that attack, they thought of another attack on the village of Hostan in the east of Barzan. The Peshmerga forces, led by Sako Kanyelnji who replaced Hussein Mergasori, along with other Peshmerga officials, fortified their trenches and established a defensive line. They promised that this time too they would not allow the government army to implement its plans and designs. At first, as always, the Iraqi Army began heavy artillery shelling of the trenches and aerial bombardment. Then, on the morning of August 8, 1963, they began a wide and extensive attack. This time too, the Peshmerga forces stood against them and did not let them fulfill their dream, and they quickly defeated their attack and they fled from the battlefield with dozens of dead and wounded. The Peshmerga forces had only one Martyr and two wounded.
After that attack, on August 10 and the following days, the Iraqi Army and the hired gunmen (Jash) launched two more attacks on the heights behind the village of Aste so that from there they could dominate the village of Rezan. However, in both of those assaults, they could not succeed; rather, they were severely defeated, resulting in dead and wounded, along with the capture of 4 Military personnel. It is worth mentioning that in all the attacks of this epic, Barzani, the leader of the revolution, was always closely and directly supervising the battles.
The government of Iraq, in the continuation of the war and aggression and in revenge for all those successive defeats it suffered, had nothing left but to continue shelling and bombing Barzan and the surrounding villages until they were laid to waste and ruin.
After the defeat, collapse, and major losses that the Iraqi Army suffered on both the Barzan and Sherwan battlefronts, the Situation of the Iraqi Army became largely chaotic and confused. Therefore, Staff Brigadier Ibrahim Faisal al-Ansari, Commander of the 2nd Division in the Chame and Sherwan Mazn axis, notified the Chief of Staff of the Army, Tahir Yahya, via telegram and proposed a peaceful solution and dialogue. The Chief of Staff did not object and told him to contact Sheikh Ahmed Barzani, the Sheikh of Barzan. Consequently, on 22 September 1963, al-Ansari sent a letter through Saeed Asaad Shitan to Sheikh Ahmed, in which he requested that he send a delegation to him and the Governor of Erbil for discussion and agreement. After consulting with Mustafa Barzani, the leader of the revolution, Sheikh Ahmed decided to respond to al-Ansari with a letter.
As a result of the dialogue between Sheikh Ahmed and the Iraqi government, in which they had demanded the disarmament of the Barzanis, and Sheikh Ahmed had demanded the withdrawal of the army and the Jash from the government, they eventually agreed that Barzani, at the request of Sheikh Ahmed, would leave the Barzan region on 10 October 1963 and return to Soran and the Balakayati region. Thus, the military attacks and assaults of the government on the Barzan region were lifted and ended, and peace and tranquility prevailed over the region.
Sources:1. Hozhin Masoud Sarni, The September Revolution in the Bahdinan Region 1061- 1975, First Edition, 2018.
2. Haji Mirxan Dolamari, Searching for Justice, Volume One, Second Edition, Isra Press, Tehran, 2021.
3. Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurd Liberation Movement, Volume Three, Part One, The September Revolution 1961-1975, Ed: First 2004.
4. Wali Zubair Hostan, Several Events and Incidents in the Revolutions and Uprisings in Barzan, Ed: First, Rojhalat Press, Erbil, 2017.
5. Karwan Johar Muhammad, Idris Barzani 1944- 1987 Life and Political and Military Role in the Kurd Liberation Movement, Hevi Press, Erbil, 2019.
6. Ghazi Adel Gardi, A Peshmerga in the Service of the Barzani Path, Haji Birokhi, Volume One, Second Edition, Turkey, 2021.
7. Hashim Sherwani, The Barzan Region, Geography-History-Culture, First Edition, Ministry of Culture Press, Erbil, 2008.