After the Iraqi government began to retreat and renege on implementing the terms of the March 11, 1970 agreement, and after four years of negotiations, it was able to reorganize itself militarily through arming and reorganizing the army through relations and agreements it signed with the Soviet Union under the name of the (Friendship and Cooperation) treaty, with the aim of obtaining Iraqi military support to end the Kurdish revolution this time in a short period. As for the Soviet Union, it aimed to invest capital in Iraq to strengthen its position in the Middle East.
As a result of the Peshmerga forces besieging the Rawanduz garrison camp, and before the war broke out again, the Iraqi Army at the beginning of April withdrew all its forces to the Spilik camp, and also moved the headquarters of the brigade belonging to it, which was in the village of Balkiyan north of Ali Beg Valley, to the same place.
On April 16, 1974, Mustafa Barzani , the Kurdistan Democratic Party leader and commander of the Aylul Revolution, issued an order to launch an attack on the Spilik camp located west of the town of Khalifan, with the aim of confusing the Iraqi Army and seizing this strategic site. Although the Peshmerga carried out the attack, it did not succeed due to the strong defense and the large number of soldiers and advanced weapons of the Iraqi Army. In another indication, it was reported that the Iraqi government attacked the impregnable Spilik area, where an Iraqi military brigade was stationed, besieged by the Peshmerga. After fierce fighting and confrontation, the Iraqi Army was able to break the Peshmerga siege, and the two forces belonging to the Iraqi Army joined each other, preparing for a major attack on Rawanduz.
A battalion of Peshmerga forces was deployed in Sarchiya under the command of Mirxan Muhammad Amin. After information about the Iraqi Army's advance reached the revolution's leadership on this axis, orders were issued in late April to the Second Zozk Battalion, led by Lieutenant Yunis Rozbayani, to move its mission to Sarchiya, alongside the aforementioned battalion to strengthen the defense line on this axis. The mission of this Peshmerga force, which was on its way from Hawdiyan via the Khlan-Biyaw valley, was to defend the main Spilik-Khalifan road, because the Iraqi Army intended to advance from there to the revolution areas in Rawanduz, Diana, and Balakayati.
It is clear that on the morning of that day, before the arrival of the Second Battalion, the Iraqi Army had already begun to advance on the Spilik-Khalifan road. They were confronted by a small force that was stationed there beforehand, and in a strong defense, after the martyrdom of five Peshmerga and the injury of a number of others, they were able to inflict heavy losses on the Iraqi Army and force it to retreat.
On that night when Yunis Rozbayani's battalion arrived at the site, they were very tired and exhausted due to covering a long distance. They asked about the Situation and if there was any news about the Iraqi Army's movements, as they had to go up to Sarchiya. But the Peshmerga who were previously stationed on this axis answered them that they had no information in this regard. In the morning, they saw that the Iraqi Army had taken control of Sarchiya. An order was issued for the company that was defending the Spilik-Khalifan road to go to Pansar at the end of the Sarchiya mountain range overlooking Khalifan. After the Iraqi Army took control of Sarchiya, a telegram arrived from the Military Office to conduct a counterattack and retake Sarchiya from the Iraqi Army. The Peshmerga forces began preparing to launch an attack on Sarchiya. All the Peshmerga who were on their way from Khlan-Biyaw to Pansar to launch an attack on Sarchiya from that site were targeted all day by Iraqi aircraft that were flying in the sky of the region.
As soon as the Peshmerga forces arrived at Pansar and were busy preparing to launch an attack on Sarchiya, a force from the Iraqi Army suddenly attacked the Peshmerga positions, but the Peshmerga resisted them fiercely and were able to eliminate all the soldiers except for 3 or 4 soldiers who were wounded and captured by the Peshmerga. There were also martyrs and wounded on the Peshmerga side. After that, the Peshmerga forces began to launch a counterattack and carry out the leadership's orders, but a problem appeared before them, which was the leakage of information from within the Peshmerga forces to the Iraqi Army due to treason by one of the Peshmerga officials, and thus the Iraqi Army obtained the zero hour for the attack, and for this reason, the Peshmerga attack failed.
After the defeat of the Peshmerga at the hands of the commanders of that axis of the battle, the revolution's leadership was asked to shell the "Spilik" camp, because it contained a large number of soldiers and they were in a state of readiness for attack and advance. The revolution's leadership saw that this was an important task and immediately assigned the commander of Artillery of the Revolution "Hali Dolmari" to shell the "Spilik" camp. Within one night, two cannons were brought to Khlan and Biyaw, and on Mount Bradost, the artillery commander and the commander of the Second Zozk Battalion were monitoring the shelling. With the sunrise, the order was issued to the artillery to begin work, and after intensive shelling, heavy damage was inflicted on the camp as a result of the explosion of the Ammunition depot and the fuel site inside the camp.
Sources:1- Ibrahim Jalal, South Kurdistan and the Aylul Revolution, Building and Collapse, 1961-1975, Fourth Edition, 2021.
2- Kurds and Kurdistan in American Secret Documents, prepared by Lokman Meho, translated from English by Wrya Rahmani, (Rojhalat Press - Erbil - 2009).
3- Sangar Ibrahim Khoshnaw, Military Events of the Aylul Revolution 1970-1975, First Edition, (Erbil - 2022).
4- Interview with Qadir Hassan Sitkani, a Peshmerga of the Aylul Revolution, December 31, 2022.
5- Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Three, Part Two, First Edition, (Erbil - 2004).