In the year 1974, when the Iraqi government abandoned the March 11 Agreement and once again decided on war against the Kurd, it gathered all its strike forces and launched a widespread attack on all areas under the control of the Aylul Revolution began. In response, the Peshmerga force made full preparations and moved more forces into the trenches to strengthen the defense line and confront them. The high mountains were the place of resistance and defense for the Peshmerga, and the army decided to capture the heights such as the mountains of Kiwerash, Makok, and Karokh. On the other hand, the Iraqi regime decided to intensify its attacks on the areas of the revolution at the end of August and the beginning of September and to capture strategic locations before the arrival of the cold winter season.

The commander of the 1st Division of the Iraqi Army for this attack and the capture of Kiwerash Mountain assigned the task of the operation to the 14th Force, commanded by Colonel Abdul-Jabbar al-Safi, which consisted of a number of battalions. They drew up the plan for the attack as follows: 

  • 3rd Battalion from Ranya to the end of Kiwerash Mountain from the right side.

  • 1st Battalion from Ranya to Palkana from the left side.

  • 2nd Battalion to be behind the other two battalions in Palkana.  

On August 20, 1974, the army began to move and advanced toward the top of Kiwerash Mountain, which overlooks the city of Ranya. The 3rd Battalion was able to carry out its task, which was the right front, and captured it. The reason for its advance is due to the fact that after the city of Ranya fell into the hands of the Iraqi Army, the Peshmerga force did not consider it important from a military standpoint to defend this place, so the army captured it easily. However, the 1st Battalion attacked the location assigned to it several times and was not successful, due to the strong resistance of the Peshmerga, as it was a strategic location. The Iraqi Army, despite all its efforts to capture the entire mountain, failed, even though most of the mountain had fallen into its hands. 

After much effort and struggle, the Iraqi Army was able to capture a height that was an important location on the mountain for the Peshmerga, so it constantly tried to recapture it. However, the Iraqi Army placed more than 20 outposts on Kiwerash to protect it so that it would not fall back into the hands of the Peshmerga. On the other hand, it fenced and mined the surroundings of the outposts so that the lives of its soldiers would be safe from the threat of Peshmerga attacks. But the Peshmerga did not stop at this; on September 5, 1974, it launched an attack on the outposts led by Lieutenant Shwan, by the Zozk Battalion, a battalion of the Erbil Plain Force, and another battalion led by Suleiman Sindi. On the day they wanted to start the attack, they first began to open a path in the mined areas around the outposts, but while they were busy opening the path, a Peshmerga stepped on a mine. With this, the Iraqi Army soldiers became alert and showered the Peshmerga force with a hail of bullets from all types of weapons. As a result, two Peshmerga were martyred and 11 others were wounded, so the attack was not successful.

The Iraqi government had expanded the war front in such a way that during that period, these attacks coincided with the attacks on the Rawanduz Valley, Mount Korak, Goraz, and the Diana Plain. Clearly, this was a planned scheme by the Ba'ath regime so that the Peshmerga force would be divided across the war fronts and would not have the opportunity to come to the aid of other war fronts.    

After the cold winter season approached, the Iraqi Army entered a state of defense and fortification of its military points. It received a collection of heavy weapons and winter clothing to strengthen its defense. It put all its military capability into action so that it would not lose all the areas it had occupied. It fortified the outposts and military bases by fencing and mining their surroundings, especially one of the highest peaks of the mountain, which the Iraqi Army used as an (observation post). It is worth noting that the Iraqi Army, until the collapse of the Aylul Revolution could no longer advance, but was often attacked by the Peshmerga force and was often shelled.                   

Sources:

1- Sangar Ibrahim Khoshnaw, Military Events of the Aylul Revolution 1970-1975, First Edition, Erbil, 2022.

2- Karwan Jawhar Muhammad, Idris Barzani 1944-1987 Life and Political and Military Role in the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Hevi Printing House, Erbil, 2019.

3- Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Three, Part Two, Aylul Revolution 1961-1975, First Edition – Erbil, 2004.

4- Lieutenant Khadr Abdullah Dabbagh, My Memoirs and the Artillery of the Great Aylul Revolution, Roshnbiri Printing House, Third Edition, Erbil – 2020. 

5- Ibrahim Jalal, Southern Kurdistan and the Aylul Revolution, Foundation and Collapse, 1961-1975. Fourth Edition, 2021.