The Kori Epic is considered one of the decisive battles fought by the Kurdistan Peshmerga against the Iraqi Army on April 7-11, 1991, after the defeat of the Iraqi Army in the spring of 1991 before the Peshmerga forces belonging to the Kurdistan Front and the wave of resentment and popular anger uprising in South Kurdistan, the regime's army soon received the green light from the coalition forces, and on March 27, 1991, this army confronted the Peshmerga forces in Kirkuk with force and fierce resistance. It controlled many cities and towns, until it reached the Kori Strait, and in that rugged area, the Peshmerga forces established a strong defensive line to prevent the Iraqi Army from advancing further. In two large-scale infantry attacks supported by tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, and helicopters, the Iraqi forces attacked the town of Kori but were severely defeated.
Preludes to the occurrence of the Kori Epic
After the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran, the Ba'ath regime portrayed itself as a global power, its arrogance and pride exceeded the limits of humanity, violating human rights and overstepping the life of citizens, crossing international border for the purpose of occupation through military operations under the pretext that it possessed a huge military force and the fifth army in the world in terms of numbers and weapons (Gardi, 2021, 305). This was an important factor in the Ba'ath regime's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, which controlled the country within 24 hours. All of this led to an international consensus against the regime and the imposition of the UN resolution on it which bore the number 687, which subsequently led to an economic crisis and the outbreak of the Gulf War (Charles Tripp, 2013, 336). The defeat of the Iraqi Army before the coalition forces and the weakness and lack of confidence of the Ba'athist leaders towards the Iraqi people accelerated the course of events and prepared the conditions for the apostasy and uprising of the Iraqi people, including the Kurd people, and they did not hesitate to confront the party and military institutions in the south and north of the country (Mohammed Aziz, 2024, 226). As a result, in the spring of 1991, the masses confronted the army, the armed forces, and the security forces belonging to the Ba'ath regime, which led to a comprehensive uprising (Omar Osman, 2008, 155). The 1991 uprising in South Kurdistan was a historical turning point in the life of the people of Kurdistan (Barzani, 2020, 43).
On March 5, 1991, the flame of the uprising ignited the fire in the party and military institutions of the Ba'ath regime for the first time, it began first in the city of Ranya and then expanded until it included other cities and towns of South Kurdistan, city after city fell and the masses were able to expel the Iraqi forces from them, and on March 21, 1991, Kirkuk fell into the hands of the revolution and the uprising masses (Hama Ali, 2016, 186-191).
The rapid victories proved that the uprising was the largest Kurd revolution in the history of the Kurdistan liberation movement, as it was the first time that the Kurd were able to liberate the entire South Kurdistan, including the city of Kirkuk, from the Iraqi regime (Qadir, 2022, 62).
The Iraqi Army's invasion to re-occupy Kurdistan
After losing all Kurd towns and cities, the defeated Gulf War army was looking for an opportunity to launch a counter-attack on Kurdistan and regain the liberated cities and towns, although the Kurd forces formed a fighting front within the Kurdistan Front, with the Kurdistan forces having formed one war front within the framework of the Kurdistan Front, and on March 27, 1991, they held a meeting to attack the Khalid camp in Kirkuk, which was still under the control of the Iraqi Army, but the attack did not take place due to the negligence of one of the parties of the Kurdistan Front, and otherwise, the Iraqi Army confronted the Peshmerga forces by means of tanks, armored vehicles, warplanes, and artillery shelling (Hama Ali, 2016, 192).. On March 28, 1991, and under the supervision and planning of Izzat Douri and Ali Hassan al-Majid, whom Saddam Hussein himself appointed to re-occupy Kurdistan, the regime began its first attack on the Peshmerga from Kirkuk (Qadir, 2022, 63). The Peshmerga forces suffered heavy losses in this clash and a large number of Peshmerga and uprising masses were martyred and wounded. As a result, the army was able to regain Kirkuk and move to seize Erbil and Sulaymaniyah (Ismail, 2019, 257).
The Iraqi Army launched a counter-attack on Kurdistan starting from Kirkuk with warplanes, Katyusha, long-range artillery, tanks, and armored vehicles, and although the Peshmerga forces launched a counter-attack several times, its effect was minimal in stopping the Iraqi Army's attack, due to the fragmentation of the political Parties and the lack of experience of some Peshmerga in frontal fighting on the one hand, and the inequality in power, weapons, and logistical capabilities on the other hand, which forced them to retreat (Omar Osman, 2008, 166).
The Iraqi Army continued to advance with high morale until it regained most of the liberated areas, and perhaps this was not the only reason for the failure of the Peshmerga, but there were other reasons, such as the irregular distribution of the Peshmerga on the fronts, and the unwillingness of the Peshmerga of all Parties to fight and resist, and this was a reason for preparing the atmosphere for the advance of the Iraqi Army.
It is worth noting that the advance of the Iraqi Army aroused a lot of fear and anxiety in the hearts of the residents of the cities, as the citizens were aware of the repression of the Ba'athist regime in the past, there was a danger that it would take a hostile stance and reaction towards the uprising masses, so most of the city residents migrated to the border areas, which led to the launch of the million-person migration (Qadir, 2022, 63). Many of them took refuge in both Iran and Turkey, which opened their border to the Refugee (Zebari, 2015, 517).
The Iraqi Army's attack and the Peshmerga's defensive line
When the Ba'ath regime's army succeeded in suppressing the uprising in southern Iraq, it reorganized itself to reoccupy Kurdistan and suppress the Kurdish people's uprising. It first seized Kirkuk and then advanced to retake Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. The Peshmerga forces, which at that time consisted of the Kurdistan Front parties, intensified their efforts to prevent the Iraqi Army from attacking the village of Shirawa near the town of Barda (Sidkaka, 1997, 252), but they were unable to stop the attack, so they withdrew to the Qushtapa sub-district south of Erbil. The Iraqi Army indiscriminately shelled the fleeing people in the Qushtapa plain with tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, and helicopters, and soon recaptured Qushtapa. The Peshmerga forces established a new front to stop the advance and confronted them at night, but their efforts failed and they retreated after a while, until the Iraqi Army advanced into Erbil and took full control of the city on March 31 (Omar Osman, 2008, 167). Shortly before the Iraqi Army reached Erbil, the forces in the Kurdistan Front met to discuss the combat Situation and stop the Iraqi Army's advance. The parties' opinions in the meeting differed regarding confronting the army's attack, as some saw that they could not fight and confront the regime, but one of the parties, for the sake of posturing, saw that it was capable of confronting the army and decided to fight. According to the account of a Military official, one of the Parties also believed that they could not defend inside Erbil, but he visited with the head of the Party who said that they were fighting the Kirkuk and Dibka defense line, however, they saw that none of the Peshmerga members remained in their place and they vacated the battlefield (Sidkaka, 1997, 252-253).
According to one account, the reason for the Iraqi regime's recapture of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah is that the Kurdistan Front's Peshmerga forces were not large enough to resist the regime's massive forces, and the popular forces were not well organized but participated randomly. As the Iraqi Army moved from Kirkuk to Sulaymaniyah and Erbil and advanced rapidly against the weak resistance of the Peshmerga, most of the population began to evacuate their families and children to the Iranian and Turkish border, which led to a mass exodus (Ismail, 2019, 257).
After the Iraqi Army took full control of Erbil, it continued its attempt to reoccupy all Kurdish cities and towns. For this purpose, the 28th Division, led by Brigadier General Hamad Hamu, was tasked with taking control of the Pirmam resort. On April 5, 1991, the force began to move and the Peshmerga forces established another defense line near Mala Omar to stop the army's advance, but the small number of forces, the division of the Peshmerga forces, and the disobedience of some Peshmerga forces to their commanders, Khanzad, was a reason for the withdrawal to Khanzad near the Pirmam resort. The army's advance was increasing and they were approaching Pirmam, and although the Barzan forces established a base for themselves in Bastora, they tried to stop the army from there, but they could not stop the army's advance due to the inequality in force, weapons, and ammunition (Qadir, 2022, 71).
In order to stop the Iraqi Army's advance by the Kurdistan Front leadership, there were attempts to prevent the army from advancing, so a meeting of the Military leaders of the Kurdistan Front parties was held to establish a strong defensive line in Pirmam. The meeting decided to divide the battle front into two axes on the main road between Erbil and Shaqlawa, and the first axis was handed over to the forces of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Socialist Party, and the second axis was handed over to the forces of Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Communist Party, and the Peshmerga forces remained in these areas for several days, but the army continued to advance towards Pirmam until it reached the heights of Pirmam, and the Peshmerga's defense was not strong enough to stop the advance. The Peshmerga defense line there was defeated and they withdrew to Kori.
The Iraqi Army continued to advance and seize area after area, and the Situation in Kurdistan was deteriorating moment by moment, and people were becoming more and more desperate and fleeing in large numbers. The Iraqi Army was approaching the occupation of all of Kurdistan, and the Peshmerga defenses were very weak, and the morale and hopes of the people collapsed because the Parties were not resisting properly, and the only force that responded to the Iraqi Army's attack was the force that was accompanying Masoud Barzani and carrying Dushka weapons to prevent helicopters from harming the Peshmerga and the civilians.
The army was approaching Pirmam little by little, and on April 6, 1991, a small force of Peshmerga led by Dr. Saeed Barzani and Hali Dolmari and several other Peshmerga units confronted the Iraqi Army, but they could not stop it and the town fell into the hands of the army units. The Peshmerga forces withdrew to the village of Hajaran near Kori, which can be interpreted as a Military strategy because the geographical location of Kori was more suitable for the small Peshmerga forces to establish a defense line against the massive Iraqi Army.
The Peshmerga forces were distributed in two strategic locations, where the forces of the Kurdistan Democratic Party were stationed on the Kori heights to the west, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan forces to the east, and both Hamid Afandi from the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Kosrat Rasul from the Patriotic Union were overseeing the battle (Qadir, 2022, 72-75).
The army advanced towards Kori
The Iraqi Army had planned to reoccupy all Kurdish cities and towns with the aim of suppressing the Kurdish uprising as it had suppressed it in southern Iraq, but the Battle of Kori became a bright spot in the history of the Kurdish liberation movement. It is clear that due to its difficult geographical location surrounded by rugged mountain ranges in the east and west, and overlooking from both sides a valley through which the main Erbil-Shaqlawa road passes, the Peshmerga forces decided to build a strong barrier in front of the Iraqi Army's advance to prevent the regime's forces from advancing. However, after seizing the Pirmam resort on April 7, 1991, the Iraqi Army advanced towards the Kori sub-district with a large force of infantry armed with advanced weapons consisting of a full division, supported by tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles (Qadir, 2022, 79).
The first attack:
On April 7, 1991, the Iraqi Army launched an attack with tanks and armored vehicles from the town of Pirmam towards the Kori sub-district without any significant resistance. As soon as they reached Kori, a force of Peshmerga belonging to the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by Dr. Saeed Barzani and Hali Dolmari arrived at the heights overlooking Kori, by order of Hamid Afandi the Military Commander of the battle front, and with little force and logistical capability, they were able to repel the attack and a fierce battle began. The Peshmerga forces hit their target and became a strong fortress and disrupted the army's advance in the area, and were able to repel the attack (Qadir, 2022, 79). In this battle, the Peshmerga forces inflicted heavy damage on the Iraqi Army, including the destruction of four tanks, armored vehicles, and a number of Military vehicles (Sidkaka, 1997, 255).
With the destruction of the tanks and armored vehicles that the Peshmerga targeted with RPG shells on the heights, the fighting began in the lower part, and the Peshmerga forces attacked the tanks and armored vehicles and destroyed the vehicles. The Peshmerga were not injured in this battle, and more than 14 Iraqi Army soldiers were killed, their bodies were left on the battlefield, and others were detained as prisoners.
The Peshmerga achieved a great victory in the battle, and after this defeat, the commander of the military division in the Iraqi Army insisted on advancing and continuing the attack, but the Peshmerga's defense was very strong and far from the army commanders' expectations, as he was forced to issue an order to withdraw to the Pirmam resort, in order to break the Peshmerga's defense line and reach Shaqlawa with a stronger plan and another stronger attack on Kore (Qadir, 2022, 80).
When the Peshmerga forces recorded a great victory over the Iraqi Army, the Peshmerga received information that the Iraqi Army was planning to attack the Kore positions again. The Kurdish leadership, especially Masoud Barzani the President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, who was also leading the Kurdistan Front, intensified its efforts to reorganize the battle front or the defense line, and for this reason, he called on the leadership of the Kurdistan Front parties to return their forces to the battle fronts and distribute them along defense lines, to prevent the regime from advancing and to put an end to the war of arrogance and tyranny it was waging, and amidst this call, some of the Peshmerga forces of those parties were returned.
On April 9, 1991, and based on the suggestion of the Peshmerga commander Hassan Najjar, who was the owner of the counter-attack idea, to prove the strength of the Peshmerga and its ability to attack, not just defend, but also to give a boost to raise the morale of the Peshmerga, that the enemy forces are not so many that the Peshmerga cannot defeat them.
To carry out this attack, Hassan Najjar divided his forces into three groups:
The first group was a support force consisting of Mr. Fakher, Khalid Anwar, and Mr. Iskandar, and its mission was to shell the bases and units of the Iraqi Army before attacking them.
As for the second group, led by Zainal Ahmed, it was tasked with attacking the outposts with a strategic location on the right side of the army, while the third group was led by Hassan Najjar himself, and the plan was executed as planned.
A 106 mm cannon was used in the attack, which played a major role in weakening the morale of the Iraqi Army soldiers, as it shelled the army's bases and headquarters very intensively. The Peshmerga's offensive campaign reached the outskirts of the Iraqi Army and the operation was very successful. The purpose of this attack was not to regain lost territory, but it was a tactic of war and to show the strength and weaponry of the Peshmerga. The Iraqi Army suffered heavy losses in this attack, while the Peshmerga survived unharmed (Qadir, 2022, 92-93).
The second attack:
The Iraqi Army was implementing its plan to break the Peshmerga's defense line in the heights of the Kore sub-district, and for the second time on April 11, 1991, all brigade officers gathered and tried their luck and carried out a wide attack on the Peshmerga positions, and when the Kurdistan Front forces received information about the attack via a Kurdish officer in the army, the senior officials of the party leadership led by Masoud Barzani met in the village of Hujran near Kore and reorganized the battle front and divided the fronts among the parties:
The eastern front of Derbandi Kore was entrusted to the forces of the Patriotic Union, the Toilers Party, and the People's Party.
The western front was entrusted to the forces of the Democratic Party, the Communist Party, the Islamic Movement, the Socialist Party, and Hezbollah (Sayid Kaka, 1997, 256).
According to the plan for the second attack on the Peshmerga positions, on April 11, 1991, at 4:45 AM, the army launched an intensive bombardment on the Peshmerga positions, then approached the Peshmerga positions with a large force supported by tanks and armored vehicles. At first, the Peshmerga hid as planned until the army forces approached completely, which shocked the officers and soldiers by the lack of defense, but when the tanks and armored vehicles approached the foot of the mountain, they were suddenly met with all kinds of weapons and were attacked with a barrage of bullets and set fire to the enemy forces. The Iraqi Army was confused, and the tanks, armored vehicles, and the front-line force were completely destroyed, and the soldiers of the 412th and 78th brigades were in a hurry to retreat and left their dead on the battlefield on the side of the road (Qadir, 2022, 86-87).
At first, the army's attack was somewhat successful on the heights of the western side of the area, and after the martyrdom and wounding of a number of Barzan Peshmerga forces, several places fell into the hands of the regime's forces. However, most of the Peshmerga on the front line did not leave their positions, and they were fighting and were a source of hope for a counter-attack and regaining the lost positions. Then other support forces for all parties arrived by order of Masoud Barzani the President of the Kurdistan Front to the battlefield, and climbed the heights of Armawan and other places, and were able in a short time to regain the places that had fallen into the hands of the army. A group of Peshmerga led by Hassan Najjar, which possessed 106 mm cannons, mortars, PKCs, and snipers, played an effective role in defeating the army's ranks and destroying tanks and armored vehicles (Omar Osman, 2008, 171-172). The western side of Kore was mostly attacked, and the eastern side was not attacked except for one hill near the main road that fell at first into the hands of the army but was attacked again later and the regime's forces were expelled from it (Sayid Kaka, 1997, 257).
It is worth noting that the Peshmerga recorded a great and historical victory in this attack, and the Iraqi regime was disappointed in the dream it was trying to achieve, and it was unable to achieve its goal and control the Peshmerga's defense line and reach other areas. The soldiers and officers were annoyed by the noise, fire, and bullets, but they preferred to hide at the mouth of the river, and therefore they failed and completely disappointed the Iraqi Army's hopes of achieving victory and reaching the areas they planned to occupy, and they were forced to retreat and suffered losses and injuries among their soldiers. A number of tanks, armored vehicles, and heavy weapons also fell into the hands of the Peshmerga. After the government was convinced that it could no longer advance with its forces to occupy other parts of Kurdistan, it announced a ceasefire and began negotiations to resolve the Kurdish issue (Omar Osman, 2008, 172).
Reasons for the defeat of the Iraqi Army in the Battle of KoreAlthough the Peshmerga and the Iraqi Army were largely unequal in terms of strength, weapons, and military capabilities, with a small number of Peshmerga forces, they were able to resist the Iraqi Army, as they repelled two major attacks. It is clear that the Peshmerga's victory or the army's defeat in these two attacks is due to several reasons:
1- The role of the leader: The leader is the pillar of the main force, especially in war, as he makes decisions with courage, skill, and knowledge, and delegates duties and responsibilities to his subordinates who are good at carrying them out and trust them in all circumstances.
The role of Masoud Barzani as President of the Kurdistan Front in the Battle of Kore, who was closely acquainted with the battle front, was very important because he had a plan for all developments and schemes (Qadir, 2022, 102). He was in constant contact with the leaders of the political parties (Dolmari, 2021, 298). He also played an unprecedented role in gathering the Peshmerga forces belonging to the parties in the Kurdistan Front and distributing them to the battlefields with the aim of strengthening the defense line and preventing the army's advance. His direct presence and supervision of the fighting also had a great impact on raising the morale of the Peshmerga, especially in the situation where he said (Either the enemy returns to Kurdistan over our bodies or we will not submit again) (Qadir, 2022, 102).
2- Geographical location: The geographical location of each region plays an important role in armed disputes. Military commanders and armed forces familiar with war plans always consider geographical location important for the success of battle planning and confrontation. Kore, a narrow pass surrounded by rugged mountains, was a powerful factor in the victory of the Peshmerga in two large-scale attacks by the army, supported by tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, and significant logistical capabilities, compared to the small Peshmerga force and limited weapons and equipment. However, it was an experience rich in activities and confrontations in the mountains, valleys, and high hills that were always the support and backing for the Peshmerga. On the other hand, it was difficult for the Iraqi Army to overcome the Peshmerga in a rugged mountainous area (Qadir 2022, 103).
3- The high morale of the Peshmerga: The high morale enjoyed by the Peshmerga and their sense of national and patriotic responsibility and sacrifice for the sake of defending the land and the homeland was another powerful factor in the Peshmerga's victory. Although it was a small minority, it managed to defeat countless armed armies in two major attacks, while teaching them a lesson that would make it difficult for them to try again; rather, they must resort to negotiations and peaceful solutions to solve problems (Omar Osman, 2008, 172).
Results and repercussions of the Kore epic:
Reorganizing and strengthening the defense line was the fundamental factor in the success of the Peshmerga forces in repelling two large-scale attacks by the Iraqi Army, which launched from Kirkuk with great force and military capability reaching Kore. However, the Iraqi Army suffered such a major defeat that it did not attack the Peshmerga positions again (Sayid Kaka, 1997, 256).
The failure of the Iraqi Army to achieve its dream of re-occupying all other parts of Kurdistan and suppressing the Kurdistan uprising, like the uprising in southern Iraq (Omar Osman, 2008, 173).
Adopting peaceful and diplomatic solutions such as dialogue and negotiations with the parties of the Kurdistan Front to find a solution to the problems, as delegations from the political Parties visited Baghdad several times and held talks with the Ba'ath leaders (Omar Osman, 2008, 173). Due to the risk-taking of the Iraqi regime leaders and evasion of fundamental solutions, the efforts failed and the negotiations did not yield any positive results (Qadir, 2022, 123).
United Nations Resolution 688, which condemns the Iraqi regime for suppressing and exterminating civilians in Iraq, especially Kurdish citizens, as well as the Provision of a safe zone above the 36th parallel and providing immediate assistance to the regions, through the efforts and proposals of the French government in the Security Council (Mam Jalal 2017, 190).
When the 36th parallel was designated as a border barrier against the threats of the Ba'athist regime in Kurdistan, Baghdad withdrew its administrative institutions from Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Duhok, and Garmian on November 24, 1991, which created an administrative vacuum for managing the affairs of the citizens (Qadir, 2022, 131). To fill this gap and solve this issue, the Kurdistan Front decided to hold parliamentary Election in Kurdistan, which were held in a peaceful and free atmosphere on May 19, 1992, and subsequently the Kurdistan Regional Government was established (Barzani, 2020, 45).
The Kurdistan Region became a refuge for many victims, militants, and free people from Iraq and the opposition forces that rule the country today (Barzani, 2020, 45).
Sources:1- Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Four, Part Two, First Edition, (Roxana Press - 2021).
2- Masoud Barzani, For History, Third Edition, (Roxana Press - 2020).
3- Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, Translation: Muhammad Hussein Ahmed and Abdulqadir Kalhur, Review: Dr. Muhammad Abdullah Kakesur, Third Edition, (Rojhalat Press - Erbil - 2013).
4- Mirza Ibrahim Qadir, The Story of Kore, the Pride of a Nation, (Roxana Press - Erbil - 2022).
5- Ghazi Adel Gardi, A Peshmerga in the Service of the Barzani Path - Haji Birokhi, Volume Two - Second Edition, )Turkey - 2021(.
6- Omar Osman, The Life of a Kurd, Volume One and Two, Second Edition, (Mukriyani Press - 2008(.
7- Aziz Muhammad, Digging in Memory, First Edition, (Erbil - 2024).
8- Nuri Hama Ali, The History of the Struggle of a Peshmerga Between Life and Death, Second Edition, (Erbil - 2016).
9- Sayid Kaka, Memoirs of a Peshmerga, First Edition, (Ministry of Culture Press, 1997).
10- Muhammad Ali Ismail, My Memoirs, Seventy Years of Life and More Than Half a Century of Struggle, First Edition, 2019.
11- Haji Miran Dolamari, In Search of Justice, Volume Two, Second Edition, Kurdistan - 2021.
12- Mam Jalal, A Meeting of a Lifetime, Prepared by Salah Rashid, Part Two, First Edition, (Karo Press, 2017).
13- Shimal Zebari, Some Hidden Truths in the Gulan Revolution, First Edition, (Rojhalat Press, Erbil - 2015).