Abd al-Karim Qasim, right from the beginning of the Aylul Revolution, had boasted in his press conference that he had crushed the head of the revolution, but this initial victory of the Kurdish revolutionaries in the Badinan region, on one hand, proved all the government's news and clamor to be false, and forced the government to rely more than ever on the jash (collaborators) and mercenaries of the region. This reliance of the government stemmed from the fact that the army was not familiar with the nature, roads, and footpaths of the rugged mountains of Kurdistan, and the army's morale had collapsed and it was not familiar with guerrilla warfare.
Furthermore, the Rekani jash had turned to Turkey and were handed over by the Turkish government to the Iraqi side to return to Mosul via Kani Masi. They were mercenaries whose purpose was to create a barrier between the Kurdish revolutionaries and the Kurdish villages of Northern Kurdistan, all of whom were sympathetic to the Kurdish revolution and were with it in spirit and wealth. For example, a Peshmerga who participated in the events of that time pointed out and wrote: "A number of fighters from Turkish Kurdistan also arrived in the region to support Barzani and the revolution; Sadiq Marinos was their Commander, he attacked the jash and dealt them a deadly blow."
The government, with all its capabilities, wanted to take the Zawita valley. In order to promote its advances, it had brought a large number of army, police, and jash into the region. The situation of the battle front by the revolutionaries was such that from the east, the front was under the command of Muhammad Amin Mirkhani, Haji Birokhi, Mullah Shani Bedaruni, Haris Bedaruni, and Hadi Hasko, who had Hasso Mirkhani Zhazhuki as his assistant. From the western front, Commanders such as Asad Khoshawi, Isa Suwar, Ali Khalil, Hasso Mirkhani, Omar Agha Dolamari, and Suleiman Mirkhani were present, and a large number of Peshmerga from the Kurdish tribes of Badinan participated, such as the Mizuri Zheri, Berwari Zheri, Doski Zheri, Guli, Sindi, and Nerwayi.
After the government army, which consisted of the 2nd Command of Dohuk, with the help of jash and police, intended to besiege the Zawita region with heavy weapons using tanks, armored vehicles, and various artillery, they became two independent parts. One part went directly towards the village of Zawita, and the other part, most of whom were jash, went towards the villages of Iminke, Bablo, Sirk, and Tanirka, and then to reunite in the village of Zawita. After these forces shelled the region, they began their attack. Mullah Mustafa Barzani was near the battle front, and the Peshmerga were waiting for his order. At first, Barzani ordered them to destroy the main road of the army's arrival, in order to stop the advance. Barzani's goal in this action was to distract the army and liberate the Sersing sub-district. Some of the jash outposts remained on the Zawita road.
The government force, which had reached the Zawita valley on December 5 to 6, 1961, was besieged from all sides by the Peshmerga force and was attacked. As a result, the government forces retreated and chased their jash towards Amedi. Mullah Mustafa Barzani decided to liberate the Sersing sub-district, which boosted the morale of the Peshmerga. The forces moved towards Sersing and made contact with the government force and the people of the region. They took control of the Sersing police station, and the aforementioned sub-district was liberated without a fight on December 10. From then on, the Peshmerga fully took control of the Zawita valley, which was strategically important. The Sersing region was an important gateway to reach the Zawita valley. Also, that region overlooks the city of Dohuk, and at the same time, that region was close to the Barzani Headquarters, which was in the village of Gar Baraske. On the other hand, it was very close to the Qadish region, where the revolution had set up a hospital in the Inishke cave, for the rapid transport of the wounded and to protect the hospital from the danger of enemy shelling.
The achievements of this battle were great in terms of morale, because the Peshmerga liberated Sersing and chased away the Rekani jash. It was a good push, as only three months had passed since the outbreak of the revolution. It also had a great resonance; the people realized the fact that it is possible to change the bitter reality of Kurdistan through the self-sacrifice of the Peshmerga and to achieve victory over the large army of the state, and the government also fully understood the capabilities, courage, and beliefs of the revolutionaries after that battle.
As a result of that series of battles, despite the government's great efforts to confront the revolutionaries and gather its forces to return to their positions in the region and re-occupy the areas, after the Battle of Zawita valley, the government suffered a greater defeat in the epic of Lomana, for which reason it was forced to resort to negotiations.
Sources:1- Abdulfattah Ali al-Butani, Badinan Region 1925 – 1970, Vol. 2, Salahaddin University Press, Erbil, 2017, p. 159.
2- Hawkar Karim Hama Sharif, Aylul Revolution, Salahaddin University Press, Erbil, 2012, p. 147.
3- Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Vol. 3, Part 1, Ministry of Education Press, 2004, p. 57.
4- Rajab Jamil Habib, Amedi (Al-Amadiyah) 1921 – 1975, Hawar Press, Dohuk, 2012, p. 236.
5- Shirzad Zakaria Muhammad, The Kurdish National Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan February 8, 1963 – July 17, 1968, Dar Spirez for Printing and Publishing, Dohuk, 2006, p. 129.
6- Haji Mirkhani Dolamari, Searching for Justice: Another Side of the History of the Revolution in Kurdistan 1943 – 1991, Vol. 1, No place of publication, 2021, p. 238.
7- Hozhin Masoud Sarni, The Aylul Revolution in the Behdinan Region 1961 – 1975, Zakho Center for Kurdish Studies, 2018, p. 72.
8- Ghazi Adil Gardi, A Peshmerga in the Service of the Barzani Path... Haji Birokhi 1916 – 1975, Vol. 1, Turkey, p. 185.