In fact, the Party's organizations within the military units in Zakho were constantly conveying the news and movements of the army in the region to the official of the Zakho Local Committee of the Party, Mullah Salih Haji Balqosi, who in turn was conveying the information to Isa Suwar, the commander of the region. Since March 1962, the Peshmerga had taken control of a number of government sites in the Zakho Strait and the Silivana (Asihi) sub-district, and they strengthened their positions in the village of Turkeja and Geli Qalama. An urgent message reached Isa Suwar from the Zakho Local Committee stating that a military battalion from Sheikhan, led by Colonel Majid Sabe' al-Abousi, had moved with the aim of swapping with the Batifa battalion, on the morning of April 1, 1962, from a mountain pass towards the Fayda camp. At 8:00 AM, the vanguard of the convoy reached inside the Zakho Strait. It is worth noting that this information had previously arrived through Khurshid Salim Shira, who is a member of the Party's organizations in the Second Battalion of the Third Brigade, who in turn delivered the news of the battalion's transfer to Mullah Ali Rashad Hajani, to inform the Peshmerga commander Isa Suwar.
Upon receiving the news, Isa Suwar held a meeting in the village of Hassan Ava with a number of wing commanders of the Peshmerga leaders, and the goal of the meeting was to develop a plan to strike the Second Battalion of the Third Brigade of the Iraqi Army. After discussing the plan, the Peshmerga forces inside the Zakho Strait were divided into several groups as follows: The first group, which consists of Isa Suwar and some of his guards and a number of Peshmerga from the Barwari Bala region led by Darbaz Haruri, was stationed at the bottom of the Zakho Strait near the village of Hassan Ava.
The second group was stationed in the lower part of the strait from the western side, and consisted of wing commander Hashim Mirozi, Yasin Rasha Mirozi, Ahmed Maho Sharanshi, Ali Rasho, Farhan Ali, and Corporal Darwish. In the middle of the strait, the third group was stationed from the eastern side up to near the Sahriji station and consisted of wing commander Ali Halo, Salman Khurshid, Saeed Halo, Saeed Khalil, and a number of other Peshmerga. As for the fourth group, which consisted of Sheikh Mustafa Haji Mahmoud, Muhammad Khalid, Numan Muhammad, Shaban Saeed, and Jangir Sivo, it was assigned the task of engaging the military point in Kalfarini. While the fifth group, which consisted of Suleiman Lachi Mazuri Bala, Corporal Suleiman Doski, Ali Ali Saif al-Din, Sheikh Siddiq Abdullah, Amin Ozmani, and a number of other Peshmerga, was stationed on the eastern side of the Zakho Strait up to its middle. As for the last group, it was composed of a number of Peshmerga led by wing commander Yasin Muhi Dizoyi and Peshmerga Abdulrahman Muhammad Abdul, and this group was assigned to strike and engage the military point Kokhin – Turkeja. In the same meeting, the battle plan was set, so that everyone would adhere to the instructions. The plan was for the first shot to be from Ali Halo's side. It was also emphasized that the Peshmerga must protect themselves from the enemy, especially from aircraft, and the thing that was emphasized a lot was not to allow two vehicles from the vanguard of the convoy to cross at all, because the first belongs to the battalion commander and the second to the wireless communications vehicle, so if they reached Fayda in Duhok, forces would come to their rescue.
After this organization and preparation, the confrontation plan was set in the form of an ambush. The Peshmerga hid in complete secrecy and with a tight military plan along the strait, covering themselves with tree leaves. The first action the Peshmerga took was to cut the telephone lines between Zakho and Mosul.
On the morning of April 1, 1962, the battalion convoy arrived inside the strait, which consisted of 35 vehicles, five tanks, with five jeeps for officers, in addition to two pickup trucks to guard the battalion commander and wireless communications equipment. Upon their arrival at the end of the strait, the military convoy was subjected to heavy gunfire from both sides by the Peshmerga. The clash resulted in the death and injury of a number of officers and soldiers, including the battalion commander, Colonel Muhammad Yahya, who was wounded, and his assistant, Lieutenant Colonel Nasim Turkomani, was killed. Six officers and 173 soldiers and non-commissioned officers were also captured by the Peshmerga, and 53 officers and soldiers were wounded. In addition to that, the Peshmerga managed to seize all the weapons, ammunition, military vehicles, and equipment belonging to the battalion, which were mentioned earlier. On the other hand, the Peshmerga's losses were three Martyrs: Yasin Mirozi, Sabri Abdi, and Qadir Ismail Hassan, in addition to a number of Peshmerga being wounded, including Muhammad Yusuf Gravi, Ismail Hajar, Faidhi Othman, Suleiman Aso, and others.
That battle had a wide echo in military, political, and popular circles. Even the Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army, Major General Ahmed Salih al-Abdi, had difficulty informing Abd al-Karim Qasim of the telegram regarding the defeat, as he was delayed in delivering it for more than 10 minutes. In Baghdad, a rumor spread at that time that the Chief of Staff asked one of the officers to place the telegram on the President of the Republic's desk, and this led to the spread of the news of this shameful defeat on a large scale throughout Iraq, even that Iraqi citizens mocked the propaganda of Abd al-Karim Qasim, who had previously announced his elimination of the gangs and the outlaws! At the same time, the army realized that the war and fighting in Kurdistan had entered a new phase and that eliminating the Kurdish movement was not an easy matter. Even the Iraqi political forces and parties realized that the continuation of the war in Kurdistan would cause more damage to Iraq and problems would continue, except for the Ba'ath Party and the Arab nationalists whose position towards the Kurdish issue did not change, as they were promoting that the Kurdish rebellion was continuing because of the flexibility of Abd al-Karim Qasim and his lack of use of violence against them, and therefore it could be suppressed and eliminated through intensive bombing and the use of greater force and more severe violence against them. It turned out that the government's reaction was indeed to send more troops and military units to Kurdistan, and at the same time, a campaign of pursuit and large-scale arrests of civilians, sympathizers, and supporters of the Kurdish revolution began in the Zakho district on charges of supporting the Kurdish revolution, and they were thrown into prisons without any evidence or witnesses.
Sources:1- Abdul-Fattah Ali al-Butani, Badinan Region 1925-1970, Volume 2, (Salahaddin University Press - Erbil - 2017).
2- Muhammad Salih Pendroyi (Jagar Soz), Life and Struggle of the Martyr Commander Abdulrahim Jasim Barzani, No place of publication, 2020.
3- Rojin Chalabi Munir, Zakho 14 July 1958 – 6 March 1975, Zakho Center for Kurdish Studies, Zakho, 2018.
4- Shakib Aqrawi, Years of Ordeal in Kurdistan. The Most Important Political and Military Events in Kurdistan and Iraq from 1958 – 1980, (Al-Thaqafa Press - Erbil - 2007).