In his book "Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement", Masoud Barzani mentioned that the revolution leadership had been thinking for some time about striking the oil facilities for clear reasons, including: oil resources were being exploited by many parties while the Kurds were deprived of them, and the revenues of this oil were used to purchase weapons and destructive bombs, then tested on the Kurds. The Kurdistan revolution also needed new activities to prove its strength to the new Iraqi regime composed of the Baathists who seized power for the second time in the coup of July 17-30, 1968. The goal was to do something meaningful to the government and send a clear message to the Baathists that the Kurds could reach the government's largest economic resource.
The Peshmerga Forces attacked oil pipelines more than once, but it seems it did not bother the government or the oil companies. After the revolution leadership despaired of reaching an understanding in Iraq regarding dialogue and solving the Kurdish issue, it decided to carry out such activities and began preparing and implementing the attack plan. On the evening of March 1, 1969, a special force belonging to the revolution leadership attacked the Kirkuk Oil Company and caused it severe damage. They broadcast the voice of the Kurds' protests to the world.
Sami Abdul Rahman was tasked with leading this operation with a group of experienced commanders who assisted him, such as: Fakher Mergasori, Faris Bawa, Hama Sur Hussein, Izz al-Din Qara Muhammad, Arif Darwish, and Qadir Jabbari. After careful investigation, a complete map was drawn, and the focus was on the (concentration plant). This is where oil is collected from all oil wells after passing through gas separation stations operating continuously, then it goes to the warehouses where the oil is exported.
Sami Abdul Rahman said in an interview: They benefited from the Kurds who were working in the oil companies to collect information. After careful investigation, they found that the oil and gas separated from the separation stations all go to a warehouse called (concentration plant) north of the city of Kirkuk. Where all the oil is collected from 10-12 gas stations and comes to the mentioned plant, then it is pushed to K1, and from there it is transported via pipelines to Syria and the Mediterranean Sea. Sami Abdul Rahman believed that this oil storage warehouse was one of the most important places to cause severe damage to the oil company through it.
The preparations for carrying out this operation took two months, as experts in the field of these activities visited the area several times to find a suitable place to conduct the operation successfully. The operation was planned to be carried out in complete secrecy and information did not leak to the government intelligence agencies. After several meetings with the participation of Idris Barzani, the first Military Commander of the revolution, a group of young men from the Halkurd force were placed in a special training course on the weapons allocated for this operation, such as 120mm and 106mm cannons, and the 106mm cannon was relied upon heavily as it is flammable and incendiary. Before starting the operation, a field sweep was conducted, where Sami Abdul Rahman and Fakher Mergasori left the village of Galala and were joined in Erbil by Faris Bawa, commander of the Erbil Plain force, and Hama Sur, commander of the Shwan battalion near the oil facilities, and they determined the location for installing the cannons. The information gathering preparations ended at the end of September 1969, and February 15 was the last stage of training. Qadir Jabbari said in an interview: We left Choman in a very cold winter where snow fell heavily, and we faced great difficulty in transporting the cannons and bullets from Khanqa to Warti until we reached Zini Astirokan. Fortunately, the people of Warti helped them a lot because more than 100 horse loads of artillery and Ammunition were transported to the Erbil plain via mountain roads.
After finishing the initial preparations, on February 25, 1969, the Revolution Protection Agency published several news items about the Peshmerga's intention to carry out a large-scale commando campaign in the Erbil plain to deceive the government. With the aim of drawing the government's attention to the Erbil plain and moving the largest number of troops to it in order to weaken other fronts, the result of this deceptive Military propaganda campaign was the transfer of a battalion that was a major threat to the Peshmerga Forces and a terrible obstacle to the success of the operation, from Radar to the Erbil plain, which helped the Peshmerga carry out the operation easily.
On the night of March 1-2, 1969, the Peshmerga Forces reached the places marked on the map. According to the plan, things were going well. At nine in the evening, the cannons began hitting the company's facilities and continued for nearly two hours. They set fire to a concentration warehouse and a huge flame covered the sky of the area. At 11 PM of the same night, a telegram arrived from Sami Abdul Rahman to the leadership that they had done their work successfully. The Peshmerga Forces were on full alert in case of a government counterattack, and about 800 Peshmerga were on alert to protect the cannons and confront the army's attack. On the fronts of Yerwil, Estab Line, Barut Khana behind Rahim Awa, Darman, and the Taq Taq-Altun Kupri road.
Half an hour after burning the oil company, the soldiers launched an attack on the Peshmerga on both the Estab Line and Rahim Awa fronts. A force of 300 Peshmerga responded with heavy weapons such as cannons, machine guns, and RPG shells to the soldiers' attack, and they attacked twice to reach the cannons but were defeated. From 10:00 to 1:30 PM, the Peshmerga Forces continued to fight the army's attack and caused it severe damage. Then the Peshmerga Forces retreated and the planes continued to bomb the Shwan and Jabbari areas and the bombing continued for the next day. It is worth noting that after carrying out this major operation in the city of Kirkuk, the Peshmerga returned safely and sent a message of victory to Barzani, the Commander of the revolution, who congratulated and thanked them.
A Year later, the Oil People magazine, which was published by the oil company, mentioned the repair of the damaged sites, and it took eleven months to repair them because they were severely damaged. It is worth noting that this attack on the oil company in Baba Gurgur was a great victory for the revolution, and it was also an open message to the Baath government that the revolution's force is capable of penetrating deep into Iraq's regions and striking its interests. At the same time, this attack had a great echo in international media. The prolonged Kurdistan war plunged the Iraqi government into a major financial crisis and increased its debts, because the daily fighting cost millions of dinars in addition to many deaths. All these were important reasons for the government to enter into negotiations with the revolution leadership. Its only reaction was to surround the company's facilities with tanks and infantry to protect them.
Sources:1- Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Three, Part One, September Revolution 1961-1975, Ministry of Culture Press, 1st ed., Erbil, 2004.
2- Karwan Jawhar Muhammad, Idris Barzani 1944-1987 Life and Political and Military Role in the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Hevi Press, Erbil, 2019.
3- Shawkat Mulla Ismail Hassan, Days from the History of the September Revolution, First Edition, Erbil, 2007.
4- Ari Karim, Several Living Pages from the September Revolution, Khabat Press, Duhok, 1999.
5- Ibrahim Jalal, Southern Kurdistan and the September Revolution: Building and Collapse 1961-1975, Fourth Edition, 2021.
6- Hawkar Karim Hama Sharif, The September Revolution, Salahaddin University Press, First Edition, Erbil, 2012.