The first step to eliminate him begins with his arrest and exile when he was three years old; the Ottomans, due to the revolution of Sheikh Abdulsalam Barzani, imprisoned him with his family in the Mosul prison and later decided to exile them to Sulaymaniyah. After this, Barzani reached an age where he could take up a weapon, and from then on, he was relied upon in battles, and gradually his name fell upon the lips of every Kurd.

First: The attempt to assassinate Mullah Mustafa Barzani in the Year 1961

After the suppression of the first Barzan revolution and the handover of Sheikh Ahmed Barzani and Mullah Mustafa Barzani by the Turks to the monarchical government of Iraq and their detention along with their families in Mosul, and also after Khoshawi Awdi also ignited the Khoshawi revolution, the monarchical government, and especially Husamaddin Juma who was both the police director at the time and also managing the affairs of the former governor who was Omar Nazmi, believed that it was Mullah Mustafa who was encouraging Khoshawi's movement and that they were drawing their inspiration from him, so in 1936 he attempted to poison Mullah Mustafa Barzani and put poison into his coffee, after which Mullah Mustafa Barzani fell unconscious for two weeks and was saved from death by a miracle.

In the attempt to save Mullah Mustafa, those mentioned are: Sheikh Ajil Yawer and the families of Kashmula and Abawi, and there is also a rumor from within that at that time a French doctor who lived in Syria had a role in treating Mullah Mustafa.

 

 

Second: The attempt to assassinate Mullah Mustafa Barzani in the Year 1961

After the outbreak of the September Revolution on September 11, Year 1961 and the success of the Peshmerga in several battles, the government of Iraq ostensibly attempted to approach and negotiate with the Kurdish political leadership, and especially General Mustafa Barzani, but secretly they attempted to kill and assassinate Mullah Mustafa several times and also spread rumors of Mullah Mustafa's death and killing several times.

Abd al-Karim Qasim, who had completely lost control of himself and was trying to further consolidate his dictatorial rule in Iraq and wanted Mullah Mustafa Barzani to abandon the legitimate rights of the people of Kurdistan and go sit in Barzan himself, for this purpose sent a letter to Sheikh Ahmed Barzani and asked him to encourage President Mustafa Barzani to sit with them. Sheikh Ahmed did not reject this and sent two of his delegates to Mullah Mustafa so that he would agree to meet with the delegate of Abd al-Karim Qasim, who was Brigadier Hassan Aboud, the person in charge of the Fifth Brigade. Masoud Barzani recounts this in the first part of the third volume of the book (Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement) as follows:

On December 17, the government designated a place near Sarsang for both negotiators, but Barzani did not go to that place and remained in a place near the village of Bamerne, then sent several envoys to the place designated for the meeting, to wait for the arrival of Hassan Aboud and take him with them to the place Barzani himself had chosen for the meeting. The opinion turned out to be correct, and Qasim had the intention to eliminate both him and his envoy Hassan Aboud at their meeting place. As soon as Hassan Aboud left the place and went with Barzani's envoys to Barzani, four aircraft came and bombed the place very heavily and precisely. Hassan Aboud saw that heavy bombing from afar with his own eyes and was overcome by severe shame, and he found that stance very difficult to bear to a large extent.

As it appears in this account, the experience and foresight of the immortal Barzani thwarted the enemies' plans and did not let their wishes come true, and their terrorist attempt failed. Mustafa Barzani had told Hassan Aboud right there: ''I do not ask for anything from Qasim to give me. Let him give the rights of the Kurd people and I will leave Iraq and go''.

Third: The attempt to assassinate Mullah Mustafa Barzani in the Year 1971

Despite the fact that the September Revolution had achieved part of its goals, and also for the first time autonomy for Kurdistan was officially recognized, the enemies of Kurdistan and President Mustafa Barzani did not fall in their attempts and continued with plans and plots to assassinate him.

On September 15, 1971, two religious scholars, one of whom was named Abduljabbar al-Azami, a Sunni religious scholar, along with Abdulhussein al-Dakhili, who was a Shia religious scholar, visited Mustafa Barzani and he gave them a warm welcome. Those two religious scholars discussed that due to the poor situation between the revolution and the Iraqi regime and the impact of that situation on public opinion, they had visited, and they also informed him that they intended to launch a campaign among religious scholars and the people in general, in order to reduce the disputes and strengthen the peace that exists, and for this they needed the opinion of President Mustafa Barzani.

Barzani told them his opinion and approved of their effort and work and supported them. Up to here the work is normal, but what is abnormal is that the driver who brought the two religious scholars was a man from the Iraqi intelligence agency who had come to see the security procedures taken to protect Mullah Mustafa Barzani and to be familiar with the geography of the area and the Headquarters of Barzani as well, and to know where Barzani sits and where he receives his guests.

On September 29, 1971, a delegation came to Haji Omaran consisting of Abdulhussein al-Dakhili, Sheikh Abduljabbar al-Azami, Sheikh Abdulwahab al-Azami, Sheikh Ibrahim Ghanem al-Khuza'i, Sheikh Ahmed al-Hiti, Sheikh Baqir Muzaffar, Sheikh Ghazi al-Dulaimi, Sheikh Noor Yasin, and Sheikh Abduljalil al-Musawi, and they had come for the purpose of resolving the problems between the revolution and the Iraqi government. This delegation had come in two cars, one of them was a Toyota pickup, and the other was a 1963 model Chevrolet, and Suleiman Kukhi and Muhammad Kamil Ismail were the drivers of both cars and at the same time were affiliated with the Baghdad intelligence agency. 

At the Haji Omaran checkpoint, the cars were not allowed to pass, but a member of the delegation, who was Abduljabbar al-Azami, threatened to complain to the guards of the checkpoint that if they did not allow them to go, they would complain about them to President Mustafa Barzani, so they allowed them to go.

At the time the delegation arrived, President Mustafa Barzani and Dr. Mahmoud and Masoud Barzani were together. Barzani was informed that the guests had arrived and was told the names of the guests, and Barzani decided to see them after the afternoon prayer.

 The guests had brought a Quran and another religious book for Mullah Mustafa, and he accepted them from them and thanked them. After this, the Headquarters tea-maker entered and began serving tea to Sheikh Hadi Khazraji, who was sitting opposite President Mustafa Barzani. Sheikh Hadi, who had secretly brought a recorder to record Mullah Mustafa's voice, took advantage of the clinking of the cups and the tea-maker's obstruction and pressed a finger on the recorder, but instead of recording the sound, the recorder exploded, and the Sheikh was torn to pieces right there, and the room was filled with smoke.

Masoud Barzani, who was with President Mustafa Barzani before the explosion and went directly to the scene of the explosion after hearing the sound of the explosion, says: At first I thought my father's house had been blown up, then I found out that my father had gone to the guests earlier than the scheduled time, and the terrorist act had taken place there. I thought my father had been assassinated, then one of the guards informed me that President Mustafa Barzani had only been hit by a pellet and was safe.

 Masoud Barzani recounts the events after the terrorist act as follows: In the reception room, four of those who had come were killed by the pellets of the exploded bomb. Those sitting to the right and left of my father were also wounded, and whoever could run outside ran, and Barzani left the room and called the Peshmerga: Do not kill anyone, but the two drivers, after they could not reach the Chevrolet car - which, like the other car, was booby-trapped and had a rocket fixed in place of its rear lights so that if the drivers managed to escape, they would hit any car that followed them, these two drivers, as they could, threw hand grenades... At five twenty-five, with the killing of the conspirators, everything was settled.

In this terrorist act, nine of the mullahs along with the two drivers were killed, and two Peshmerga were also Martyred, and fourteen others were wounded. Also, after the crowd dispersed, the timed Toyota car exploded, but it caused no damage.

For the safety of Barzani and their happiness! With the survival of the General Mustafa Barzani In the terrorist attempt, at first the leadership of the country of Iraq of the Ba'ath Party sent a telegram, and later President Abdulsattar Jawari, who was a Minister, sent his representative to President Barzani, and both sides expressed their ignorance of the terrorist act.

To reveal the facts and identify those involved in the terrorist act, a joint committee was formed, but it was fruitless, because according to the information that the Revolution's Parastin agency had obtained, the regime itself had planned it. 

Perhaps Nazim Kazzar, who was the responsible of the Iraqi Intelligence Agency at that time, had an effective role in implementing the plan, but the decision-maker was above him, and he was only an executor. Masoud Barzani, in the third volume of the second part of the book Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, says that Mam Jalal told me that when he was in Baghdad for talks in 1983, Saddam had admitted that he was aware of the attempt to assassinate Mullah Mustafa and was very unhappy that the attempt had not succeeded.

Fourth: The assassination attempt of 1972

 After the failed terrorist attempt of the Iraqi Intelligence Agency at the Barzani Headquarters, that agency did not learn a lesson and continued its terrorist acts. On July 15, 1972, a person named Ibrahim Gabari came to Iraq from Syria, allegedly expelled by the Syrian government. Gabari frequented the Fifth Branch of the Party and established a relationship with the Iraqi Intelligence Agency, and they entrusted him with a mission.

Nazim Kazzar, who was the responsible of Iraqi Intelligence at that time, instructed Ibrahim Gabari to get close to the Barzani Headquarters and attempt to assassinate President Mustafa Barzani, and if he could not assassinate him, then either Idris Barzani or Masoud Barzani, who were the sons of the leader of the Kurdistan liberation movement, to assassinate one of them. Gabari agreed to this and came towards the liberated areas under the control of the revolution and there asked to Masoud Barzani see, because he has an important secret.

Masoud Barzani sees Gabari, and Gabari tells him about that request that the Iraqi Intelligence Agency had of him, and he tells him not to give up and to continue his work, to see what else they ask of him. Masoud Barzani tells him, and he tells him not to give up and continue his work, to see what else they ask of him.

The Iraqi Intelligence Agency, in order to make Gabari believe that he is telling the truth that he is close to the Barzani Headquarters, asks him to take pictures with President Mustafa Barzani and Idris Barzani and Masoud Barzani. This request of Gabari is fulfilled by Masoud Barzani. By taking the pictures to Nazim Kazzar, he believes Gabari and sends him a bag full of (TNT) into the liberated areas under the control of the revolution, so that he can assassinate Mullah Mustafa Barzani with it, and if that is not possible, to blow up the (TNT) with one of his two sons.

The (TNT) bag is handed over to the revolution's intelligence, and later the news of the failed assassination attempt on Barzani is published in Khabat newspaper, but the Ba'ath regime, like their previous terrorist acts, denies this terrorist attempt as well and declares their ignorance of it, and their Ministry of Interior denies the existence of any relationship of any Iraqi government institution with this terrorist attempt.

Saddam Hussein formed a committee to follow up on the facts, which consisted of Abdulkhaliq al-Samarrai, the representative of the Ba'ath Party, Mukarram Talabani, the representative of the Communist Party, Muhammad Mahmud Abdulrahman, the representative of the Party, Aziz Sharif, Dara Tawfiq, and Ihsan Shirzad. The committee came to Nawprdan and looked at the evidence and met with Ibrahim Gabari, who confessed to everything, and also revealed the names of the officers who participated in that plot, including Officer Basil al-Araji. Abdulkhaliq al-Samarrai asked Ibrahim Gabari about the appearance of that officer, and it turned out that his statement was true, because he knew him. Al-Samarrai promised to raise the results of the follow-up committee to his superiors, but the Ba'ath Party did not take any measures for this incident, until the time when Nazim Kazzar carried out a coup on June 20, 1973, to eliminate President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and seize power in Iraq. At that time, the Ba'ath regime admitted that the terrorist attempt of September 29, 1971, and the terrorist attempt of July 15, 1972, were the work of Nazim Kazzar with the encouragement of an outside hand.

Apart from these attempts, there were several other terrorist attempts that were carried out with the intention of disrupting the security under the revolution's authority, but due to the vigilance of the revolution's security agencies, none of them were successful. What is more important than this is that at no time and in no Situation did the revolution's leadership respond to terrorist attempts with terrorist attempts, and the revolution and the Kurdistan liberation movement, if it wanted to take revenge, would always take revenge on those who carried out the terrorist act, not women, children, and innocent people. This was something that President Mustafa Barzani fully believed in and always encouraged those around him and the leaders of the Kurdistan Peshmerga forces never to carry out any Activity in which innocent people would become victims.

Sources:

1. Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume One, Aylul Revolution 1931-1958, First Edition (Erbil - Ministry of Peshmerga Press - 2004).

2. Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Three, Part Two, Aylul Revolution 1961-1975, First Edition (Erbil - Ministry of Peshmerga Press - 2004).

3. Archive of the Encyclopedia Board of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.