To take control of that mountain, Barzani, the leader of the revolution, held consultations and discussions with the Peshmerga commanders Ra'is Bakr and Muqaddam Aziz Akrayi and Haji Birokhi, Mahmoud Kawani, Shakir Beg Oghzbeg Zarni, and Rahman Sheikh Wasani, along with Mirka Agha Khailani, to set a plan and strategy for attacking the outposts on the mountain. Given that this mountain was an important point on the map of Kurdistan that overlooked the Erbil plain and was a strategic location that connected the regions of Erbil, Khoshnawati, Soran, and Balakayati, and was also a gateway for the relationship with the regions of Pishdar, Bitwen, and Sulaymaniyah, the government always tried to take control of the region, believing that if it lost Safin Mountain, it would become a major threat and danger to the Balakayati region, which was the headquarters of the revolution's leadership.
For the Peshmerga forces to carry out the attack and implement the plan to capture Safin Mountain, several points were important for them to launch the campaign against, such as the outposts from Kani Shilana to Kani Gwez. With the start of the assault on the outposts at 5:00 AM on August 23, 1962, in a very short time, the Peshmerga forces were able to take control of Kani Shilana, Kani Gwez, Bana Nok, and the village of Khoran. They were also able to inflict heavy losses on the Iraqi Army, which consisted of the killing of 52 soldiers, most of whose bodies were left on the battlefield and fell into the hands of the Peshmerga. In the following days, they tried to retrieve the bodies of their dead through the personalities and religious clerics of the region.
In this battle of Safin Mountain, which was the first epic of the Peshmerga at the beginning of the September Revolution, three Peshmerga were Martyred and three others were wounded.
After taking control of Safin Mountain, the Peshmerga units began to move and patrol around the mountain to strike further blows at the Iraqi government, carry out other Peshmerga activities, and take control of the bases and outposts of the army, police, and mercenary gunmen (Jash). After obtaining the approval of the revolution's leadership, the Peshmerga forces aimed to capture the Gomaspan police station and besieged the barracks. Clearly, the commanders wanted the battle to end without bloodshed from the beginning and for no casualties to occur on either side, and for the police who had taken refuge inside to surrender to the Peshmerga forces. For this, they tasked the village headman to visit the police station and speak with them about this matter.
However, the situation lasted for several days because the siege continued for three days as they were waiting for them to surrender. It appeared that the police, commanded by Sergeant Faizi, had decided to resist and not surrender, and at the same time, they were in a relationship with their superiors to come to their aid. Therefore, during that period, the Iraqi Army tried twice and attacked the region to break the siege on the barracks and rescue the police, but their efforts were useless and unsuccessful because every time their attack was repelled and defeated by the Peshmerga forces, as the Peshmerga had promised that this police station would be captured at any cost.
The Iraqi Army tried for the third time and wanted to adopt a deceptive plan to get behind the Peshmerga forces and from there reach the police station and break the siege, but the Peshmerga forces very carefully were able to thwart this trick and tactic of the Iraqi Army this time, shoot at them from behind, dismantle their plan, and chase them out of the region.
As it appeared, the situation of the police was also heading towards confusion. On the third day, when they lost hope in the Iraqi Army coming to their aid, this time they wanted to escape and take advantage of the darkness of the night, but the Peshmerga realized this as well, so they moved closer to the barracks and tightened the siege. With the onset of the darkness of the night, the police opened the doors of the barracks and lined up, wanting to exit the barracks and escape. At that moment, the Peshmerga opened fire on them. Although one of the police was wounded, all the others raised their hands and surrendered. Then the Peshmerga took control of the barracks, entered the police station, and seized all the weapons, ammunition, and all the equipment that were in the station.
In that battle to capture the Gomaspan police station barracks, these military commanders participated: Rashid Bishuni and Fikri Birokhi, as well as the unit leaders Ahmed Masti Kanyelnji and Mullah Amin Hostani.
From then on, the entire Khoshnawati region fell under the authority of the revolution, and the organization and work that were carried out in Badinan, Bradost, and Balakayati in terms of organization, party affairs, and the establishment of Peshmerga bases and Headquarters were carried out in the same way there. Barzani, to manage the affairs of the revolution and the region, entrusted the responsibility of Khoshnawati to Bakr Abdul Karim and appointed Mahmoud Kawani as his assistant. From here, Khoshnawati became one of the strong fortresses of the revolution, thanks to the stance of the region's residents in terms of their revolutionary spirit, generosity, loyalty, and support. However, the life of the region's personality and brave Peshmerga commander Mahmoud Kawani did not last long; he came under aerial bombardment and was severely wounded. After a few days of being transferred to the revolution's hospital in Betwata, due to the severity of his wound, he bid farewell to the revolution and the homeland on September 1, 1962.
Sources:1- Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Three, Part One, September Revolution 1961-1975, First Edition 2004.
2- Khurshid Shira, Struggle and Blood, Memoirs of the Years of Peshmerga Struggle, Third Edition, Erbil, 2015.
3- Ghazi Adil Gardi, A Peshmerga in the Service of the Path of Barzani, Haji Birokhi, Volume One, Second Edition, Turkey, 2021.
4- Ari Karim, Several Living Pages from the September Revolution, Khabat Press, Duhok 1999.
5- Shawkat Mullah Ismail Hassan, Days in the History of the September Revolution, First Edition, Erbil, 2007.