In the autumn of 1969, the balance of power and victory shifted towards the Aylul Revolution as a result of the successive defeats of the forces affiliated with the government, including the army, the commando forces, and the mercenary fighters (Jash), in those military campaigns that had widely covered the revolution's areas with the support of tanks, artillery, aircraft, and advanced weapons. This led the revolution's leadership to devise a precise and solid plan to attack the Marga front and expel the army and mercenary fighters from that area, which contained two regiments and twice as many mercenary Jash fighters. 

The participants in this Peshmerga attack, who were assigned by the revolution's leadership, consisted of a part of the Rizgari Force, a part of the Kawa Force, and several units of the Halgurd Force, under the supervision of commanders Fakir Mergasori and Heso Mirxan Zhazhuki and Rais Abdullah, and the field commanders of the battle were Ezadin Qaramahamad, Mam Wsu Dzayi, Arif Darwish, and Faqi Hamadamin.

November 6, 1969, was the date the attack began. The Peshmerga, as planned, launched the assault at the designated time and place, and from the very first hour, they were advancing moment by moment. Masoud Barzani in the book 'Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement', while discussing this Peshmerga battle, says: "The relations department in Parastin informed me that chaos and disarray had spread through the enemy's ranks. Army units had broken away from their commanders, rebelled, and fled. The headquarters of both regiments had joined the rebels, and the commander of a company had been killed. Furthermore, the morale of the Jash had collapsed, and the enemy had nothing left but a peak on Mount Asos. Once that peak was captured, victory would be fully achieved, and the enemy would completely abandon Marga."

An hour later, that peak was captured by the Peshmerga force, and the government forces fled towards Sarsian. The Peshmerga campaign in that area lasted for three days. During those three days, the entire area fell into the hands of the Peshmerga force. As a result of this Peshmerga campaign, the government forces suffered heavy human and material losses, consisting of more than 230 killed, among whom was a mercenary (Jash) leader named Ali Abbas Agha. Also, a large amount of weapons, ammunition, bullets, military equipment, and food supplies fell into the hands of the Peshmerga.

The Peshmerga's victory in the Battle of Marga resulted in several outcomes:

1- A portion of the area's inhabitants, including some of the Mirawdelyan Aghas, had intended to join the government due to the glimmer of the army's previous victories. However, the Peshmerga's victory this time and the defeat suffered by the government forces changed their minds, and they backed away from their position, except for a small group.

2- A large number of the forces of the faction affiliated with the old Political Bureau reconsidered their opinions and positions, turned against their faction, and joined the revolution.

3- The Iraqi Army forces shifted from a state of campaigning and aggression to a state of defense. They did not stop there, but also thought about reconsidering their aggressive policy and abandoning their repressive military efforts, and thinking about peaceful solutions and dialogue with the Kurdish revolution, because what they had planned through military invasion was not achievable for them. 

The Baathists reached the conviction that they were unable to collapse the Kurdish revolution. This is evident in a statement by Hardan Tikriti, the then Minister of Defense of Iraq, who says: "In reality, the Kurds, through their heroic resistance over a full half-century, were able to bring the government to its knees to such an extent that we had reached a point where, if the war had continued, we feared that Baghdad itself would fall into the hands of Barzani." He also says: "The rate of Iraqi Army casualties in one month before the March 11, 1970 agreement was 362 killed and wounded every week." Therefore, the central government could not hold out and requested a ceasefire and negotiations from the revolution's leadership, which resulted in the March 11, 1970 agreement. 

Sources:  

1- Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Three, Part Two, Aylul Revolution 1961-1975, First Edition, Erbil - 2004.

2- Ari Karim, Some Living Pages from the Aylul Revolution Duhok, Khabat Printing House - 1999.

3- Sangar Ibrahim Khoshnaw, Military Events of the Aylul Revolution 1970-1975, First Edition, Erbil - 2022.

4- Khoshawi Ali Kanyelnji, Memoirs of Aziz Qazi Hamad Surchi, Daneshfar Printing House, Erbil - 2023.

5- Karwan Johar Muhammad, Idris Barzani 1944-1987 Life and Political and Military Role in the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Hevi Printing House, Erbil - 2019.