The Battle of Kore is one of the decisive battles and confrontations that the Kurdistan Peshmerga recorded against the Iraqi Army from 7–11 April 1991, after the Iraqi Army was defeated in the spring of 1991 by the Kurdistan Front Peshmerga forces and the wave of popular protests that rose up in South Kurdistan, and all the cities and towns of South Kurdistan were liberated. It did not take long for the regime's army to be given the green light by the coalition forces, and on 27 March 1991, it began to confront the Peshmerga very fiercely from Kirkuk and recaptured many cities and towns until it reached the Kore pass. In that difficult area, the Peshmerga forces established a solid defense line to prevent the Iraqi Army from advancing further. It was then that it launched two massive infantry attacks supported by tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, and combat helicopters on the town of Kore, but it was severely defeated.

The events leading up to the Battle of Kore

After the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran, the Ba'ath regime portrayed itself as a global power; its arrogance and self-conceit had exceeded the boundaries of humanity. Human rights violations in the form of assaults on the lives of citizens and the crossing of international borders for the purpose of occupation through military operations were justified by the claim that it possessed a massive military force and the fifth-largest army in the world in terms of numbers, weapons, and equipment (Gardi, 2021, 305). These were a clear factor in the Ba'ath regime's attack on Kuwait on 2 August 1990, which it occupied within 24 hours. All of this led to the formation of an international coalition against the regime and the imposition of United Nations Resolution 687 upon it, after which it found itself in an economic crisis and the outbreak of the Gulf War (Charles Tripp, 2013, 336). The defeat of the Iraqi Army by the coalition forces and the weakness and lack of confidence of the Ba'ath leaders regarding the Iraqi public accelerated the course of events and created the ground for a turnaround and uprising for the peoples of Iraq, including the Kurdish people, in such a way that they did not hesitate to confront the party and military institutions in the south and north of that country (Muhammad Aziz, 2024, 226), and as a result, in the spring of 1991, the public confronted the army and the armed and security forces of the Ba'ath regime, resulting in a nationwide uprising (Omar Osman, 2008, 155). The 1991 uprising of South Kurdistan was a historical turning point in the life of the people of Kurdistan (Barzani, 2020, 43).

On 5 March 1991, for the first time, the flames of the uprising set fire to the party and military institutions of the Ba'ath regime. It started in the city of Ranya and then other cities and towns of South Kurdistan rose up against the Ba'ath one after another, expelled them from the country, and on 21 March 1991, the city of Kirkuk also fell into the hands of the revolutionary forces and the uprising public (Hama Ali, 2016, 186-191). The rapid victories proved that this uprising is considered the greatest Kurdish revolution in the history of the Kurdistan liberation movement, given that it was the first time that the Kurds were able to take the entire South Kurdistan, including the city of Kirkuk, out of the hands of the Iraqi regime (Qadir, 2022, 62).

The invasion of the Iraqi Army to reoccupy Kurdistan

The defeated army of the Gulf War, after losing all those cities and towns of Kurdistan, was looking for an opportunity to launch a counter-attack on Kurdistan and return the liberated cities and towns to its control. Although the Kurdish forces, which had formed a battle front within the framework of the Kurdistan Front, held a meeting on 27 March 1991 to attack the Khalid military base in Kirkuk, which was still under the control of the Iraqi Army, the attack was not carried out due to the negligence of one of the parties of the Kurdistan Front. On the contrary, the Iraqi Army confronted the Peshmerga forces with tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, and warplanes (Hama Ali, 2016, 192). On 28 March 1991, under the supervision and plan of Izzat al-Douri and Ali Hassan al-Majid, who were tasked by Saddam Hussein, the then-president of Iraq, to reoccupy Kurdistan, the regime's first attack on the Peshmerga began from Kirkuk (Qadir, 2022, 63). In that confrontation, the Peshmerga forces suffered heavy losses, and a large number of Peshmerga and uprising public were martyred and wounded at the Khalid training base. As a result, the army was able to recapture the city of Kirkuk and began moving to recapture Erbil and Sulaymaniyah (Ismail, 2019, 257).

The Iraqi Army, with a solid plan and great military capability in warplanes, Katyushas, long-range artillery, tanks, and armored vehicles, launched an attack from Kirkuk back onto Kurdistan. Although the Peshmerga forces carried out counter-attacks several times, it did not have much effect on stopping the Iraqi Army's onslaught due to the fragmentation of political forces and the lack of experience of some Peshmerga in front-line warfare on the one hand, and the imbalance in terms of force, weapons, and logistical capability on the other, they were forced to retreat (Omar Osman, 2008, 166). The Iraqi Army, with high morale, continued to advance until they reoccupied most of the liberated areas. Perhaps that was not the only reason for the Peshmerga's defeat as discussed, but there were other factors involved, such as the lack of coordination in the distribution of Peshmerga across the defense lines and the refusal of Peshmerga from all parties to fight, which further widened the ground for the Iraqi Army's advances.

It is worth noting that the advances of the Iraqi Army brought great fear and anxiety to the hearts of the residents of the cities, because the citizens were familiar with the oppression of the Ba'ath regime in the past and there was a fear that it would take a hostile stance and retaliate against the uprising public, so most of the residents of the cities migrated towards the border areas, and thus the mass exodus began (Qadir, 2022, 63). A large part of the fleeing people took refuge in both the countries of Iran and Turkey, which had opened their borders to refugees (Zebari, 2015, 517).                                

The attack of the Iraqi Army and the Peshmerga defense line

When the Iraqi Army of the Ba'ath regime succeeded in suppressing the uprising in southern Iraq, it reorganized itself to reoccupy Kurdistan and suppress the uprising of the Kurd people. It first took control of the city of Kirkuk and then advanced to reoccupy Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. The Peshmerga force, which at that time consisted of the forces of the parties of the Kurdistan Front, concentrated their efforts to prevent the attack of the Iraqi Army in the village of Sherawa near the town of Perde (Sayidkaka, 1997, 252), but they were unable to stop the attack, so they retreated to the sub-district of Qushtapa south of Erbil. In the plain of Qushtapa, the Iraqi Army began blindly bombarding the people fleeing in that plain with tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, and helicopters, and it did not take long before they regained control of Qushtapa as well. The Peshmerga force established a new battle front against them to stop their advances and confronted them at night, but the efforts were in vain, and after a while, they retreated from there as well, until the advances of the Iraqi Army reached inside the city of Erbil and on March 31, they fully controlled the city (Omar Osman, 2008, 167).

Before the Iraqi Army reached the city of Erbil, the forces within the Kurdistan Front met to discuss the Situation of the war and to stop the advances of the Iraqi Army. In that meeting, the parties had different opinions regarding confronting the army's attack; some believed that they could not fight and confront the regime, but one party, for the sake of posturing and showing off, was of the opinion that they were able to confront the army and decided to fight. According to one of the accounts of a military official of one of the parties, he simultaneously believed that they could not defend inside Erbil, but together with the official of the party that said we will fight, they visited the defense line of the Kirkuk-Dibega road where the force had been stationed, but they saw that not a single Peshmerga remained in their place and they had abandoned their positions (Sayidkaka, 1997, 252-253).

According to an indication in an account, the reason for the recapture of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah by the Iraq regime goes back to the fact that the Peshmerga force of the Kurdistan Front was not of the size to be able to confront that massive force of the regime, and the popular force was not well organized but participated randomly. At the time when the Military force of the Iraqi Army set off from Kirkuk towards Sulaymaniyah and Erbil and its advances were fast in the face of the weak defense of the Peshmerga, most of the residents began to be displaced and to get their families and children to the borders of Iran and Turkey, and thus a nationwide exodus began (Ismail, 2019, 257).                

After the Iraqi Army fully regained control of Erbil, it continued its attempt to reoccupy all the cities and towns of Kurdistan. For this task, the 28th Division, commanded by Brigadier General Hamad Hammo, was assigned to take control of the summer resort of Pirmam. It was on April 5, 1991, that the force began to move. The Peshmerga force set up another line of defense near Mala Omar to stop the army's advances, but the small number of forces, the dispersion of the Peshmerga, and the disobedience of a part of the Peshmerga force to their superiors led to them retreating from there to Khanzad at the foot of the Pirmam summer resort. The army's advances were constantly on the rise and they were approaching Pirmam. Although the Barzan force had established positions in Bastora and wanted to stop the army from there, due to the inequality in terms of force, weapons, and ammunition, they could not stop its advances (Qadir, 2022, 71).     

To stop the advances of the Iraqi Army, there was a continuous effort by the leadership of the Kurdistan Front to prevent the Iraqi Army from coming further forward. For this purpose, a meeting of the military leaders of the parties of the Kurdistan Front was held in Pirmam to set up a strong line of defense in Pirmam. In that meeting, it was decided that the battle front would be divided into two axes on the main road of Erbil-Shaqlawa. The first axis, below Sari Rash, was entrusted to the force of the Patriotic Union and the Socialist Party. The second axis, Sari Awre and the village of Ziyarat, was entrusted to the forces of the Democratic Party and the Communist Party. For several days, the Peshmerga force remained in those places, but the army's advances towards Pirmam continued until they reached the curves of Pirmam. The Peshmerga defense was not strong enough to stop the advances, and the Peshmerga defense line there also collapsed, and they retreated to Kore.

The Iraqi Army continued to advance and took control area by area. The Situation of Kurdistan was getting worse by the moment. People were becoming more hopeless and were fleeing in droves. The Iraqi Army was getting closer to reoccupying all of Kurdistan. The Peshmerga defense had become very weak. The morale and hope of the people had collapsed at once because the parties were not defending as necessary. The only force that was repelling the Iraqi Army's attack was the force that was with Masoud Barzani and had DShK weapons and did not let the helicopters cause damage to the Peshmerga and the people. As the army was getting closer to Pirmam, on April 6, 1991, a small Peshmerga force commanded by Dr. Saeed Barzani and Hali Dolamari and several other Peshmerga units confronted the Iraqi Army, but they could not be prevented, and that town also fell into the hands of the army units. The Peshmerga force retreated to the village of Hujran near the Kore pass, and this can be interpreted as a military strategy because the geographical location of the Kore pass was much more suitable for that small Peshmerga force against the massive army of Iraq to establish a defense line there. The Peshmerga force was divided into two strategic locations: the heights above the Kore sub-district in the western part were occupied by the Party force, and the eastern side was entrusted to the Union force. Hamid Effendi from the Party and Kosrat Rasul from the Union were supervising the battle (Qadir, 2022, 72-75).  

The army's advances towards Kore

The Iraqi Army had drawn up a plan to reoccupy all the cities and towns of Kurdistan, with the aim of subjecting the Kurdish uprising to the same fate as it had suppressed the uprising in southern Iraq. However, the Battle of Kore became a shining point and a historical turning point in the history of the Kurdish liberation movement. Clearly, due to its difficult geographical location, surrounded on the east and west by rugged mountain ranges, both sides overlook a valley through which the main Erbil-Shaqlawa road passes. The Peshmerga Forces decided to create a strong barrier in front of the Iraqi Army's advances so as not to allow the regime's forces to advance any further. Naturally, after the Iraqi Army seized the Pirmam summer resort on April 7, 1991, with a large force of well-armed infantry consisting of a full division, supported by tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles, it advanced toward the town of Kore (Qadir, 2022, 79).      

  • First attack:

On April 7, 1991, the Iraqi Army launched an attack from the town of Pirmam toward the town of Kore with tanks and armored vehicles. They reached Kore from Pirmam without encountering any Peshmerga resistance. As soon as they reached Kore, a force of the Kurdistan Democratic Party Peshmerga, under the command of Dr. Saeed Barzani and Hali Dolamari, on the heights overlooking the Kore pass, by order of Hamid Effendi, the military commander of the battle front, confronted them with a small force and limited logistical capabilities, repelled their attack, and a fierce battle began. The Peshmerga Forces achieved their goal, became a strong wall, stalled the army's advances in that pass, and were able to defeat the attack (Qadir, 2022, 79). In that battle, the Peshmerga inflicted heavy losses on the Iraqi Army, which consisted of the destruction of four tanks and armored vehicles and a number of military vehicles (Sayedkaka, 1997, 255).        

Along with the destruction of the tanks and armored vehicles that the Peshmerga targeted on the heights with (RPG)s, hand-to-hand combat and confrontation began in the lower part as well. The Peshmerga attacked the tanks, armored vehicles, and destroyed vehicles. In the heat of that battle, the Peshmerga emerged unscathed, but the Iraqi Army forces had more than 14 soldiers killed, whose bodies were left on the battlefield, and a number of others were taken prisoner.

In that battle, the Peshmerga achieved a great victory, and after this defeat, the commander of the Iraqi Army's military division insisted on advancing and continuing the attack. However, the Peshmerga's resistance was very strong and far from the expectations of the army's military commanders. When the division commander realized that the army could no longer advance, he was forced to order a retreat to the Pirmam summer resort, in order to break the Peshmerga's defensive line with a more well-planned and stronger attack on the Kore pass and reach Shaqlawa (Qadir, 2022, 80).

When the Peshmerga Forces recorded a great victory over the Iraqi Army, the Peshmerga received information that the Iraqi Army planned to attack the Kore pass positions again. The Kurdish leadership, especially Masoud Barzani, the President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, who also led the Kurdistan Front, intensified all efforts to reorganize the battle front or the defensive line. For this, he asked the leadership of the Kurdistan Front parties to return their forces to the battle front and distribute them along the defensive line, so that together they could prevent the regime's attempt to advance any further and set a limit to its arrogance. In the meantime, several other Peshmerga forces of the parties were returned to the battle front.

On April 9, 1991, upon the suggestion of Peshmerga leader Hassan Najjar, who had conceived the idea of a counter-attack, to show the strength and capability of the Peshmerga to the opposing side that they were capable of attacking, not just defending, and also to give a boost to the morale of the Peshmerga that the enemy force was not so insurmountable that the Peshmerga could not defeat it.

To carry out this attack, Hassan Najjar divided the force into three groups:

The first group was the support force, consisting of Said Fakhir, Khalid Anwar, and Said Iskandar, whose task was to shell the Iraqi Army's bases and units before they attacked.

The second group, commanded by Zainal Ahmed, had the task of attacking the army's outposts on the right, as the location was very difficult and strategic. 

The third group was led by Hassan Najjar himself, and the plan was implemented as it was.

In that attack, a 106mm cannon was used, which played a prominent and effective role in breaking the morale of the Iraqi Army soldiers because it shelled the army's bases and headquarters very heavily. The Peshmerga's offensive reached the heart of the Iraqi Army, and the activity was carried out very successfully. The purpose of this attack was not to regain lost territory, but rather it was a battle tactic to demonstrate the strength and power of the Peshmerga. In that attack, the Iraqi Army suffered heavy losses, and in return, the Peshmerga emerged unscathed (Qadir, 2022, 92-93).   

          

  • Second attack:

To implement its plan, which was to break the Peshmerga's defensive line in the pass and the heights of the Kore town, the Iraqi Army, for the second time, had all the brigade officers meet on April 11, 1991, and tried their luck, launching a widespread attack on the Peshmerga positions. The Kurdistan Front forces, having received information about this attack from a Kurdish army officer, the high-ranking officials of the party leadership, led by Masoud Barzani, met in the village of Hujran near the Kore pass, reorganized the battle front, and distributed the positions among the parties' forces:

  • The eastern front of the Kore pass was entrusted to the forces of the Patriotic Union, the Toilers Party, and the People's Party.
  • The western front of the pass was entrusted to the forces of the Democratic Party, the Communist Party, the Islamic Movement, the Socialist Party, and Hezbollah (Sayedkaka, 1997, 256).

According to the map and plan that had been set for the second attack on the Peshmerga positions, on April 11, 1991, at 4:45 AM, the army began an intense shelling of the Peshmerga positions, then with a large force supported by tanks and armored vehicles, they approached the Peshmerga positions. At first, the Peshmerga, as planned, hid themselves until the army forces were completely close, in such a way that they shocked the officers and soldiers that there was no resistance, but when the tanks and armored vehicles approached the foot of the mountain, suddenly with all the weapons they had in their hands, they attacked them at the same time and opened fire on them. The Iraqi Army was confused, the tanks and armored vehicles and the front-line force were completely destroyed, the soldiers of the 412th and 78th brigades were in a hurry to retreat and left their dead on the battlefield on the side of the road (Qadir, 2022, 86-87).

At first, the army's attack was somewhat successful on the heights of the western side of the pass, and after the martyrdom and wounding of a number of Peshmerga of the Barzan force, several places fell into the hands of the regime's forces, but a large part of the front-line Peshmerga did not leave their positions and were fighting and were a place of good hope for a counter-attack and recapturing the lost places. Then other forces to support all parties, by the order of Masoud Barzani, the person responsible for the Kurdistan Front, arrived at the battle front and reached the heights of Armawan and other places and were able to recapture those places that had fallen into the hands of the army in a short time. A group of Peshmerga, led by Hassan Najjar, who had 106mm cannons, mortars, BKCs, and sniper rifles, played an effective role in destroying the ranks of the army and the tanks and armored vehicles (Omar Osman, 2008, 171-172). The weight of the attack mostly covered the western side of the Kore Pass, and the eastern side did not have such an attack, except for one height that was close to the main road and initially fell into the hands of the army, but then it was attacked again and the regime's forces were expelled from it (Sayid Kaka, 1997, 257).

It is worth mentioning that in that attack, the Peshmerga recorded a great and historical victory, disappointed the Iraqi regime in the dream it was striving for, and it could not achieve its goal and overcome the Peshmerga defense line and reach other areas. The soldiers and officers lost their composure due to the roar, shelling, and gunfire; rather, running and hiding in the mouth of the stream was more important to them, so they failed and disappointed the Iraqi Army once and for all in winning and reaching the areas they had planned to re-occupy, and they were forced to retreat and suffered heavy losses in the killing and wounding of their soldiers. Also, a number of tanks, armored vehicles, and heavy weapons fell into the hands of the Peshmerga. After the government was sure that it could no longer advance its forces to re-occupy other parts of Kurdistan, it announced a ceasefire and talks and negotiations began to resolve the Kurd problem (Omar Osman, 2008, 172).   

Reasons for the defeat of the Iraqi Army in the Battle of Kore

Although the Peshmerga and the Iraqi Army were largely unequal in terms of force, weapons, and military capabilities, a small number of Peshmerga were able to stand against the Iraqi Army forces and defeat two large and widespread attacks. It is clear that the success of the Peshmerga or, conversely, the defeat of the army in those two attacks is due to several factors such as:

1- The role of the leader: The leader is the main pillar of the force, especially in war. With courage, competence, and skill, he makes decisions and places tasks and responsibilities on the shoulders of lower-ranking officials who can carry them well, and there should be trust between them in all situations. The role of Masoud Barzani as the person responsible for the Kurdistan Front in the Battle of Kore, who was closely aware of the battle front, was very important because he had a plan and program for every development (Qadir, 2022, 102) and was in constant contact with the commanders of the political parties (Dolemari, 2021, 298). Also, in order to strengthen the defense line and prevent the army's advances, he had an unparalleled role in gathering the Peshmerga forces of the parties within the Kurdistan Front and distributing them across the battle fronts. Also, his direct presence and supervision of the battle had a significant effect on raising the morale of the Peshmerga, especially in a stance where he declared (Either the enemy must come over our bodies to Kurdistan or we will not let us become subjects again) (Qadir, 2022, 102).

2- The geographical location of any area plays an important role and effect in the conflict of armed warfare. Military leaders and armed forces who are experienced in war plans always consider the geographical location aspect as important for the success of the war plan and confrontation. The Kore Pass, which is a narrow corridor given that it is surrounded on all sides by rugged mountains, was a strong factor in the Peshmerga's success in two widespread army attacks supported by tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, and great logistical capability, compared to a small force of Peshmerga and limited weapons and ammunition, but a rich experience in activity and confrontation in the mountains, valleys, and high rugged hills that were always the back and support of the Peshmerga. In contrast, it was difficult for the Iraqi Army to be able to overcome the Peshmerga in a difficult mountainous area (Qadir, 2022, 103).       

3- The high morale of the Peshmerga and the sense of national and patriotic responsibility, sacrifice, and giving one's life for the sake of defending the land and the nation, was another strong factor in the Peshmerga's success, which with a small minority was able to defeat an innumerable, well-armed army in two major attacks. At the same time, it taught it a lesson that it would be impossible to try itself in that way again, but rather to resort to negotiations and peaceful solutions to resolve the problems (Omar Osman, 2008, 172). 

                   

Results and consequences of the Kore Epic:
  • Reorganizing and strengthening the defense line, which was the main factor in the success of the Peshmerga force in confronting two widespread attacks by the Iraqi Army, which started from Kirkuk with an innumerable force and great military capability until it reached the Kore Pass, but in that place, the Iraqi Army was defeated in such a way that it did not dare to attack the Peshmerga positions again (Sayid Kaka, 1997, 256).
  • The defeat of the Iraqi Army in achieving the dream of re-occupying all other parts of Kurdistan and suppressing the Kurdistan uprising similar to the uprising in southern Iraq (Omar Osman, 2008, 173).
  •  Adopting peaceful and diplomatic solutions such as dialogue and negotiations with the parties of the Kurdistan Front to find solutions to the problems, during which delegations of political parties visited Baghdad several times and entered into discussions with the leaders of the Ba'ath (Omar Osman, 2008, 173), but as a result of the arrogance of the Iraqi regime's leaders and their evasion of fundamental solutions, the efforts did not succeed and the negotiations did not result in any positive outcome (Qadir, 2022, 123).         
  • The emergence of United Nations Resolution 688 to condemn the Iraqi regime for the persecution and genocide of civilians in Iraq, especially Kurdish citizens, as well as the Provision of a safe zone above the 36th parallel and the delivery of urgent aid to the areas, through the efforts and proposal of the French state in the Security Council (Mam Jalal, 2017, 190).
  • When the 36th parallel was designated as a border barrier against the regime's threats in Kurdistan, Baghdad withdrew its administrative institutions on November 24, 1991, from Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Duhok, and Garmian, thus creating an administrative vacuum for conducting citizens' affairs (Qadir, 2022, 131). To fill that vacuum and solve that problem, the Kurdistan Front decided to hold the Kurdistan Parliament elections, which took place in a calm and free atmosphere on May 19, 1992, and subsequently led to the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (Barzani, 2020, 45).
  • The Kurdistan Region became a sanctuary for a large part of the afflicted, strugglers, and freedom-seekers of Iraq and those opposition forces that currently hold the governance of that Country (Barzani, 2020, 45). Sources:
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