The revolution became more effective with the partisan activities of the Peshmerga in pressuring the military and security institutions of the government, and it also showed higher morale among the Peshmerga, supporters, and secret organizations within the masses. It is clear that in the year 1985, hundreds of various activities were carried out in different areas of Kurdistan, causing great human and material losses to the government forces. One of these activities was that the Zakho District Committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party held a meeting with the officials of the organizations of the border area in Gali Harina on August 1985 22. In that meeting, it was discussed to form a joint force and carry out a partisan activity together in the Guli area of the Badinan region, and Mela Ramazan Qumri, the head of the district committee, would supervise it himself.  

 It is clear that during the Gulan Revolution, the Peshmerga force was organized within the framework of party organization such as branches, districts, and organizations (Gardi, 221, 269). Therefore, in that activity, the Peshmerga forces of the organizations (Shorsh, Martyr Mahmud Gawda, Ranjbaran, Martyr Muhammad Salih, Martyr Haji Isa, Govand) participated. At the beginning of the activity, a vanguard group of Peshmerga was prepared to go out and collect preliminary information about the outpost and military bases in the area. Then, they agreed to attack the Shabanie outpost above the village of Swara Stawre. The vanguard group carried out their mission and returned. The Peshmerga force began to move; first, they gathered in the village of Beghabar and divided into households to eat dinner, then they passed through the villages and hamlets of the area and climbed the heights. At 3 o'clock at night, they reached the top of the mountain. The whole force met together, and the commander of the force once again gathered the officials of the organizations on how to carry out the activity and get their opinions. But when they looked at the situation and made a quick assessment, they reached the opinion that the location of that outpost is very difficult and expected heavy losses for the Peshmerga force, so they changed their plan and decided to attack the Girdi Bie outpost.  

 First, a Peshmerga force was sent to the location for reconnaissance and information gathering with a group of those Peshmerga who were skilled in clearing mines. When they approached the outpost, those Peshmerga who were assigned to clear mines moved forward, saw those few mines, neutralized them, and moved them aside from the road. Until they approached the outpost by about (50 - 70) meters, then they returned to the Peshmerga force and explained all the information to the force commander and the Peshmerga. On August 1985 28, the plan to attack the outpost was set, with Muhammad Khalid Bosali as the head of the attack, the striking point with (RPG), and the zero hour of the attack was set at 12:30 at night. The Peshmerga force set off and climbed the mountain height until it reached near the outpost. The (RPG) striking points were identified, which were five locations. The mine-clearing experts moved forward, and due to the large number of mines around the outpost, they cleared and removed a number of others.  

 The time to start arrived, Muhammad Khalid Bosali, the head of the activity, ordered the (RPG) operators to fire their shells and hit their targets. From all five locations, the outpost was subjected to (RPG) fire. In a short time, it suffered heavy damage, as indicated, it was destroyed. Then the Peshmerga attack began, but right at the beginning, one of the Peshmerga was hit and fell. Another one, right at the (RPG) firing position, had a mine explode under his foot and his leg was severed. But the Peshmerga continued in the attack and advance. When they reached the wire under the outpost, several more mines exploded on the Peshmerga and caused them heavy losses in Martyrs and wounded. For this reason, confusion fell into the Peshmerga force, and they could not reach the outpost, but only had the opportunity to save the Martyrs and wounded and move them away, because from Batifa and the surrounding outposts, when they received the news of the Peshmerga attack on the Girdi Bie outpost, they began to launch flares (illumination) and shell and fire in the direction of the surroundings of the outpost.  

  In that activity, the Peshmerga force could not achieve the goal, which was the capture of the Girdi Bie outpost. As indicated, a very large number of mines had been planted around the outpost, and that became a major obstacle to reaching it. Although the Peshmerga force prepared with a solid military plan for clearing the mines and the steps of advancing, the density of the minefield became a major obstacle and caused heavy losses to the Peshmerga, resulting in 5 Martyrs and 11 wounded. It is worth noting that when the situation was so complicated in favor of the Iraqi Army military base, the Peshmerga force was able to evacuate all the bodies of the Martyrs and the wounded and not let them fall into the hands of the Iraqi government army forces, as after every battle, the Ba'ath army would launch a military campaign and comb the area. 

       Sources:

  1.  Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Four, 1975-1990 Gulan Revolution, Part Two, First Edition, Roxana Printing House, 2021.

  2.  Muhammad Murad, Khabata Chya, Memories and Stories of the Gulan Revolution between the years (176-1989), Kurdistan Printing House – Zakho, 2007.

  3.  Ghazi Adil Gardi, A Peshmerga in the Service of the Barzani Path, Haji Birokhi, Volume Two, Second Edition, Turkey- 2021.